### Sentimental Business Cycles

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ECB, Money Macro Workshop, 21st of March 2019

#### Introduction

**Sources of fluctuations in the economy**: Much work estimates impact of 'fundamental shocks' on the economy:

- Technology shocks / investment specific shocks.
- Monetary/ fiscal/ credit/ trade policy shocks.
- Oil price shocks/ commodity price shocks.
- TFP uncertainty shocks/ policy uncertainty shocks.

Other shocks: Large share of the variances of macro aggregates remains unaccounted for:

- News (about fundamentals) shocks.
- Animal spirits / expectational shocks / non-fundamental shocks.

### Non-Fundamental Shocks

### **Key Challenge**: How to estimate causal effects?

- Sentiments hard to translate into observables.
- Multiple equilibria: Some attempts using structural models.
- Animal spirits: Variety of recent attempts
  - Barsky and Sims (2012),
  - Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar (2018), Forni et al. (2013)
  - Mian, Sufi and Khouskou (2015), Benhabib and Spiegel (2016), Feve and Guay (2018), Lagerborg (2017)

# This paper: Central Contributions

- 1. Empirics: Estimate the dynamic causal effects of sentiment shocks:
  - Propose IV strategy for estimation.
  - Combine IV with SVAR to estimate dynamic causal effects.
- 2. Theory: Build model and apply it for structural analysis:
  - Incomplete information and Bayesian learning.
  - Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian with Search and Matching in labor market.
  - HANK&SAM provides amplification mechanism.
- 3. Quantification: Estimate key structural parameters:
  - Simulation based estimates of structural parameters.

# This paper: Key Findings

- **1. Empirics**: A deterioration in consumer confidence:
  - raises unemployment, decreases industrial production and consumption persistently
  - reduces the nominal interest rate and is non-deflationary

**Sentimental Business Cycles**: Sentimental shocks explain between 16 and 28 % of variance of unemployment and 10 to 20 % of fluctuations in industrial production at business cycle frequencies.


- **2. Theory**: Shocks to sentiments induces a powerful supply-demand feedback mechanism:
  - Countercyclical risk wedge important for amplification of negative demand effects.
  - Monetary policy can moderate demand effects.
  - Non-deflation results from interaction of supply-demand feedback.


# Sentiments: Draw data from University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence:


- Conducted since late 1940's;
- Monthly since 1977 (quarterly since 1952);
- 500 randomly drawn persons are interviewed per month;
- Asked about own situation and about US economy;

#### Three broad indices:

- Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS): A mix of:
- Index of Current Economic Conditions (ICC), and
- Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE).







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- Ludvigson (2004): ICE has predictive power for aggregate consumption growth (but not after controlling for the consumption-wealth ratio).
- Problem: Predictive power / Granger causality no causal interpretation, could be due to news about fundamentals.

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```
CI = F( fundamentals, news, noise, sentiments)
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- Can be estimated with 2SLS or 3SLS.

Assume that the dynamics of observables is:

$$\mathbf{X}_t = \mathbf{A}(L)\mathbf{X}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_t$$
 innovations  $\mathbf{u}_t = \mathbf{B} \mathbf{e}_t$  structural shocks

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- Order CI (wlog) first



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  - Proxy needs to be correlated with true shock but not equal to it
  - Allows for measurement errors and one can correct for scaling issues

#### **Instrument**: Fatalities in mass shootings in the US.

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
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- Mass shootings are unpredictable over time.
- Each event unlikely to bear much in terms of direct costs.

# Mass Shootings with 12 or More Fatalities

Incident	Location	Date	Fat.	Inj.
U. of Texas Tower shooting	Austin, Tx	Aug 1966	18	31
San Ysidro's McD massacre	San Ysidro, Cal	Jul 1984	22	19
U.S. Postal Service shooting	Edmond, Okl	Aug 1986	15	6
Luby's massacre	Killeen, TX	Oct 1991	24	20
Columbine High massacre	Littleton, Col	Apr 1999	13	24
Virginia Tech massacre	Blacksburg, VA	Apr 2007	32	23
Binghampton shootings	Binghampton, NY	Apr 2009	14	4
Fort Hood massacre	Fort Hood, TX	Nov 2009	13	30
Aurora Theatre shooting	Aurora, Col	Jul 2012	12	70
Sandy Hook massacre	Newtown, Conn	Dec 2012	28	2
Wash. Navy Yard shooting	Washington, D.C.	Sep 2013	12	8
San Bernadino mass shooting	San Bernadino, Cal	Dec 2015	14	21
Orlando Nightclub massacre	Orlando, FL	Jun 2016	49	53
Las Vegas Strip massacre	Las Vegas, Nevada	Oct 2017	58	546
Texas First Baptist Church mass.	Sutherland Springs, TX	Nov 2017	26	20
Marjory Stonemann Douglas High School	Parkland, FL	Feb 2018 🗆	► 4 <b>17</b> ►	4 ≣17

# Fatalities in Mass Shootings



# Mechanism: Shooting -> News -> Confidence

Incident	Year	TV cov.	TV time	Articles	Words
Sandy Hook	2012	168	15:57:10	130	118,354
Fort Hood sh.	2009	31	05:05:00	36	35,097
Virginia Tech shooting	2007	59	06:12:12	36	33,473
Aurora sh.	2012	70	08:49:48	75	23,715
Red Lake massacre	2005	20	00:55:12	19	18,519

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• Conclusion: Many (most) Americans would be aware of mass shooting events.

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
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- Conclusion: Many (most) Americans would be aware of mass shooting events.
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- Mass shootings impact on psychological well-being: PTSD symptoms (Hughes et al, 2011), subjective well-being (Clark and Stancanelli, 2017) - potential for direct impact on confidence.



## Implementation: US time series data:

• Monthly data.

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- Detrend all apart from  $R_t$  with 4th order time polynomial.
- Instrument: Detrended fatalities or TV media coverage




## Relevance

Weak Instrument tests, VAR with 18 lags						
	Instrument					
	Fatalit	ies	News coverage*			
Sample	Fhom	F <sup>MOP</sup>	$F^hom$	$F^{MOP}$		
1960-2015:1	12.43	6.76	-	-		
1968-2015:1	-	-	15.83	52.20		
1960-2017:6	11.13	6.36	-	-		
1968-2017:6	-	-	11.15	3.53		
1960-2007:9	5.50	4.30	-	-		
1968-2007:9	-	-	3.5	34.82		

<sup>\*</sup>Logistic transformation


 Use Montiel Olea, Stock and Watson (2017) parametric bootstrap with Newey-West HAC-robust covariance matrix

## Relevance



- Significant drop in ICE for approximately 2 years.
- Relevance √

## Relevance




- Slightly more precisely estimated for full sample
- Relevance √



# Placebo: Random Reshuffling of Shootings

IV with random reshuffling of mass fatalities



## Impulse Responses

**Dynamic Causal Effects**: Now look at dynamic causal effects of autonomous changes in consumer sentiments.

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
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- Augment with other variables.
- Look at relationship to other shocks.

## Benchmark VAR



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#### Other variables:

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- TFP: No impact.




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
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- Relationship to uncertainty: No significant impact.




# Consumption







# Fernald Capacity Util. Adj. TFP





# Uncertainty





## **EPU and Stock Market Returns**





# **Business Cycles**

## Contribution to Business Cycles:

	Variable							
Horizon	ICE	IP	U	CPI	FFR	Hrs	TIGHT	V
1	65	3	21	21	3	1	38	9
3	61	6	19	24	6	1	35	7
6	59	9	20	21	8	2	35	7
12	59	17	26	16	11	6	37	13
24	49	21	28	11	15	6	35	14
48	45	13	16	8	12	6	30	13

• Important for labor market

# Theory

#### Households:

- Search for jobs.
- Face uninsurable unemployment risk.
- Save in bonds and equity.

#### Firms:

- Monopolistically competitive.
- Face Rotemberg (1982) quadratic price adjustment costs.
- Hire labor in frictional matching market.

## **Monetary Authority:**

Sets short term nominal interest rate.

# Theory

#### Fundamental Shocks:

- Persistent aggregate productivity shocks.
- Transitory aggregate productivity shocks.
- Monetary policy shock.

#### Information:

 Imperfect common information: Only sum of productivity shocks observed.

#### Non-fundamental shock:

Noisy signal about persistent productivity shock.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & & \text{(filtering)} \\ \text{Noise shock(-)} & \rightarrow & \text{Confused with } \mathbf{A}^P \downarrow \end{array}$$

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### Households - Preferences

**Composition**: Continuum of single-member households.

**Preferences**:

$$\mathcal{V}_{it} = \max \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left( \frac{\mathbf{c}_{i,s}^{1-\mu} - 1}{1-\mu} - \zeta \mathbf{n}_{i,s} \right),$$

#### Consumption:

$$\mathbf{c}_{i,s} = \left(\int \left(c_{i,s}^j\right)^{1-1/\gamma} dj\right)^{1/(1-1/\gamma)}$$

### **Employment Status and Earnings:**

$$\mathbf{n}_{i,s} = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if not employed at date } s, \text{ home production } \vartheta \\ 1 \text{ if employed at date } s, \text{ earns wage } w_{i,s} \end{cases}$$

# Technology - Production and Hiring

#### Technology:

$$\mathbf{y}_{j,s} = \exp\left(\mathbf{A}_{s}\right) \left(\mathbf{z}_{js} \mathbf{k}_{js}\right)^{\tau} \mathbf{n}_{j,s}^{1-\tau}$$

#### **Employment Dynamics:**

$$\mathbf{n}_{j,s} = (1-\omega)\mathbf{n}_{j,s-1} + \mathbf{h}_{j,s}$$

### Hiring:

$$\mathbf{h}_{j,s} = \mathbf{q}_s \mathbf{v}_{j,s}$$

•  $v_{j,s} \ge 0$ , flow cost  $\kappa > 0$  per unit.

#### Capital accumulation:

$$\mathbf{k}_{j,s+1} = (1 - \delta\left(\mathbf{z}_{j,s}\right))\mathbf{k}_{j,s} + \mathbf{i}_{j,s}$$



# Matching technology

Timing: (i) job losses, (ii) hiring, (iii) production.

### **Matching function**:

$$\mathbf{M}_s = \overline{m} \mathbf{u}_s^{lpha} \mathbf{v}_s^{1-lpha},$$
  $\mathbf{v}_s = \int_j \mathbf{v}_{j,s} dj$ 

**Matching rates**: Let  $\theta_s = \mathbf{v}_s/\mathbf{u}_s$  denote labor market tightness:

job finding rate: 
$$\eta_s = \frac{\mathbf{M}_s}{\mathbf{u}_s} = \overline{m}\theta_s^{1-\alpha}$$

vacancy filling rate: 
$$\mathbf{q}_s = \frac{\mathbf{M}_s}{\mathbf{v}_s} = \overline{m}^{1/(1-\alpha)} \eta_s^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)}$$

# Prices, Wages, Interest Rates

**Price Setting**: Monopolistically competition firms, price adjustment costs:

$$\max \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \Lambda_{j,t,s} \left[ \frac{\mathbf{P}_{j,s}}{\mathbf{P}_s} \mathbf{y}_{j,s} - \mathbf{w}_s \mathbf{n}_{j,s} - \kappa \mathbf{v}_{j,s} - \mathbf{i}_{j,s} - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{\mathbf{P}_{j,s} - \mathbf{P}_{j,s-1}}{\mathbf{P}_{j,s-1}} \right)^2 \mathbf{y}_s \right]$$

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{y}_{j,s} &= \exp\left(\mathbf{A}_{s}\right) \left(\mathbf{z}_{j,s} \mathbf{k}_{j,s}\right)^{\tau} \mathbf{n}_{j,s}^{1-\tau} \\ \mathbf{n}_{j,s} &= \left(1-\omega\right) \mathbf{n}_{j,s-1} + \mathbf{h}_{j,s} \\ \mathbf{k}_{j,s+1} &= \left(1-\delta\left(\mathbf{z}_{j,s}\right)\right) \mathbf{k}_{j,s} + \mathbf{i}_{j,s} \\ \mathbf{y}_{j,s} &= \left(\frac{\mathbf{P}_{j,s}}{\mathbf{P}_{s}}\right)^{-\gamma} \mathbf{y}_{s} \end{aligned}$$

•  $\Lambda_{j,t,s}$ : firm owners' intertemporal discount factor.



# Wages, Interest Rates, Asset Markets

Wages: Wage function:

$$\mathbf{w}_s = \overline{\mathbf{w}} \left( rac{\eta_s}{\overline{\eta}} 
ight)^{\chi}$$

- Simplifies marginally by avoiding having wealth dependent wages.
- Correspond to Nash bargaining solution depending on parameters.

Monetary Policy: Interest Rate Rule:

$$\mathbf{R}_{s} = \mathbf{R}_{s-1}^{\delta_{R}} \left( \overline{R} \left( \frac{\Pi_{s}}{\overline{\Pi}} \right)^{\delta_{\pi}} \right)^{1-\delta_{R}} \exp \left( \mathbf{e}_{s}^{R} \right)$$

Assets and Borrowing Constraints: Limited participation

Bonds:  $b_{i,s}$  - in zero net supply.

Equity:  $x_{i,s}$  - positive net supply - only held by small subset of rich entrepreneurs

### Tractable Equilibrium

#### **Euler Equations:**

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{c}_{r,s}^{-\mu} &\geq \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_{s} \frac{\mathbf{R}_{s}}{\Pi_{s+1}} \mathbf{c}_{r,s+1}^{-\mu}, \\ \mathbf{c}_{u,s}^{-\mu} &\geq \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_{s} \frac{\mathbf{R}_{s}}{\Pi_{s+1}} \left( (1 - \eta_{s+1}) \, \mathbf{c}_{u,s+1}^{-\mu} + \eta_{s+1} \mathbf{c}_{e,s+1}^{-\mu} \right), \\ \mathbf{c}_{e,s}^{-\mu} &\geq \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_{s} \frac{\mathbf{R}_{s}}{\Pi_{s+1}} \left( \omega \, (1 - \eta_{s+1}) \, \mathbf{c}_{u,s+1}^{-\mu} + (1 - \omega \, (1 - \eta_{s+1})) \, \mathbf{c}_{e,s+1}^{-\mu} \right), \end{split}$$

- Entrepreneurs face no idiosyncratic risk.
- Asset poor unemployed will be in a corner.
- Asset poor employed will be on their Euler equation.
- Asset poor employed price the bonds.



**Technology**: Sum of persistent and transitory component:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}_s &= \mathbf{A}_s^P + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_s^T, \ \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_s^T \sim \operatorname{nid}\left(\mathbf{0}, \sigma_T^2\right) \\ \mathbf{A}_s^P &= \rho_A \mathbf{A}_{s-1}^P + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_s^P, \ \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_s^P \sim \operatorname{nid}\left(\mathbf{0}, \sigma_P^2\right) \end{aligned}$$

Information: Imperfect common information.

•  $\mathbf{A}_s \in I_s$  but  $\mathbf{A}_s^P$ ,  $\varepsilon_s^T \notin I_s$ .

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$$\mathbf{e}_{s}^{R}=\varphi\varepsilon_{s}^{S}+\varepsilon_{s}^{R},\ \varepsilon_{s}^{R}\sim\operatorname{nid}\left(\mathbf{0},\sigma_{R}^{2}\right)$$



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• Sentiments impact directly and indirectly on monetary policy.



**Endogenous earnings risk:** log-linearized Euler equation:

$$-\widehat{c}_{e,t} + \beta \overline{R} \widehat{\mathbb{E}}_{s} \widehat{c}_{e,t+1} = \frac{1}{\mu} \left( \widehat{R}_{t} - \mathbb{E}_{t} \widehat{\Pi}_{t+1} - \beta \overline{R} \Theta^{F} \mathbb{E}_{t} \widehat{\eta}_{t+1} \right)$$

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- **acyclical** if  $\Theta^F = 0$ : No endogenous risk feedback.



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- recession ⇒ lower job finding rate ⇒ higher precautionary savings demand ⇒ demand contracts at the current real interest rate ⇒ real interest rate must decline ⇒ inflation must decline ⇒ marginal costs must decline ⇒ firms post fewer vacancies ⇒ job finding rate declines - diabolical loop.

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- recession  $\Rightarrow$  lower real wage  $\Rightarrow$  less precautionary savings demand  $\Rightarrow$  demand expands at the current real interest rate  $\Rightarrow$  stabilization.

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- Procyclical risk: Stabilization
- recession ⇒ lower real wage ⇒ less precautionary savings demand ⇒ demand expands at the current real interest rate ⇒ stabilization.
- Hence, key to the endogenous risk channel is whether unemployment risk or wage risk matters most.

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•  $\widehat{\Lambda}_T^d$ : Moments that are matched:

$$\widehat{\Lambda}_T^d = \left[\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{stat}, \sigma_{\mathbf{Solow}}^2, \mathbf{IRF}_{nfore}\right]$$
 
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•  $\Lambda^m_T(\Theta_2|\Theta_1)$ : Model equivalents of  $\widehat{\Lambda}^d_T$  obtained by simulation.



$$\mathbf{X}_{t}^{\textit{theory}} = \left( egin{array}{ll} \textit{CI}_{t} & ( ext{log consumer confidence}) \\ \textit{Y}_{t} & ( ext{log industrial production}) \\ \textit{U}_{t} & ( ext{unemployment rate}) \\ \textit{P}_{t} & ( ext{log CPI}) \\ \textit{R}_{t} & ( ext{Federal funds rate}) \end{array} 
ight)$$

Simulate model to generate:

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- **3** Estimate Proxy SVAR on theory data and obtain  $\Lambda_T^m\left(\Theta_2|\Theta_1\right)_i$  .
- Sepeat N times and average:

$$\Lambda_{T}^{m}\left(\Theta_{2}|\Theta_{1}\right) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \Lambda_{T}^{m}\left(\Theta_{2}|\Theta_{1}\right)_{i}$$



# Calibrated parameters (monthly)

Parameter	Meaning	Value	
ū	st.st. unemployment rate	6 percent	
$\overline{\eta}$	st.st. job finding rate	34 percent	
$(\kappa/\overline{\mathbf{q}}) / (3\overline{\mathbf{w}})$	st.st. hiring cost	4.5 percent	
$\overline{\mathbf{R}}/\overline{\Pi}$	st.st. gross real rate	$1.04^{1/12}$	
$\overline{\Pi}$	st.st. gross inflation rate	1	
$\delta_R$	interest rate smoothing	0.25	
$\sigma_{m}$	st. dev., monetary pol. shock	0.1 percent	
$\gamma$	elasticity of substitution	8	
$\mu$	CRRA parameter	2	
α	matching function parameter	0.5	
au	output elasticity to capital	0.35	
$\xi_{\delta,z}$	elast. of depr. rate to cap.ut.	1	
δ	depreciation rate (annually)	7.1 percnet	
$(c_e-c_u)/c_e$	st.st. cons. drop upon unempl.	12 percent	


# Estimated Parameters - Preliminary

Parameter	Meaning	Estimate	
$\overline{\phi}$	price adj. cost	401	
$\chi$	real wage elasticity	0.04	
$ ho_{\mathcal{A}}$	persistence of TFP shocks	0.99	
$\delta_\Pi$	interest rate resp. to infl.	1.32	
$\psi$	impact of noise on mon.pol.	0.004	
β	implied disc. factor (annually)	0.870	
$\Theta^{F}$	implied risk wedge	0.0026 > 0	
ξ	average price contract length	7.82 months	


# Estimated Parameters - Preliminary

Parameter	Meaning	Estimate	
$\sigma_T$	std., transitory TFP shock	0.50 percent	
$\sigma_P$	std., innov. to perst. TFP	0.05 percent	
$\sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$	std., sentiment shock	0.19 percent	
hocı	confidence persistence	0.960	
$artheta_1$	confidence parameter	1.019	
$\vartheta_2$	confidence parameter	7.968	
$\sigma_{CI}$	measurement error, confidence	0.15 percent	
$\sigma_{m_2}$	measurement error, proxy	1.6 percent	


## Matched VAR IRFs - Preliminary



#### True Model IRFS - Preliminary



#### True Model IRFS



#### Model FEVD

## Contribution to Business Cycles: Forecast error variance decomposition

	Variable						
Horizon	ICE	ΙP	U	CPI	FFR	TIGHT	V
1	30	0.7	19	34	0.3	18	18
3	18	1.3	16	28	0.6	9.3	8.2
6	10	8.4	12	19	8.0	2.7	2.9
12	2.5	0.7	4.2	5.7	1.1	0.7	1.0
24	0.7	0.2	8.0	1.2	0.7	0.2	0.3
48	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1

#### Key contributions:

• Proposed dynamic causal estimation of consumer sentiment shocks

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- Find countercyclical risk wedge to be important

**ICE** is derived from answers to three questions (each given 1-5 score):

PEXP: "Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?"

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- BUS5: "..which would you say is more likely-that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good times during the 5 years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?"

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- BUS5: "...which would you say is more likely-that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good times during the 5 years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?"
  - Responses tend to be bimodal (either 1 or 5).

- PEXP: "Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?"
- BUS12: "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole-do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?"
- BUS5: "...which would you say is more likely-that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good times during the 5 years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?"
  - Responses tend to be bimodal (either 1 or 5).
  - ICE = 100 + "% positive respondents" "% negative respondents" (normalized to 1966 base).

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CI = F (fundamentals, news, noise, sentiments)

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- Look at response to innovation to CI<sub>t</sub>.
- Do not claim causality



• Confidence innovation predicts future income and consumption growth.

Barsky and Sims: Construct NK model with imperfect information.

TFP follows:

$$\begin{aligned} a_t &= a_{t-1} + g_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t} \\ g_t &= (1 - \rho_a) g^* + \rho_a g_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{g,t} \end{aligned}$$

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- $\varepsilon_{a,t}$ : Technology shocks.
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
$$s_t = g_t + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

- $\varepsilon_{s,t}$ : Sentiments/animal spirits (pure expectational shocks).
- Barsky-Sims model-equivalent of **CI**<sub>t</sub> is:


$$\mathbf{CI}_{t} = \zeta_{1}\left(a_{t} - a_{t-1} - g_{t|t-1}\right) + \zeta_{2}\left(g_{t|t} - \rho_{a}g_{t|t-1}\right) + \zeta_{2}\varepsilon_{c,t}$$




## Impact on Gertler-Karadi MP Shock




#### Alternative IV




## Cholseky TFP





## Cholseky VIX




#### Other stock market variables









## No detrending of mass fatalities



#### Before the Great Recession



## Whole Sample



## Whole Sample Alternative IV with TV coverage

