



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM

Reverse Stress Testing

M. Baes E. Schaanning

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Test Conference

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
Elena Rancoita
ECB/DGMF

* The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and do not necessarily coincide with those of the ECB


Research question

Which stress scenarios lead to maximal contagion from fire-sales losses, assuming that banks, when forced to liquidate, will do so optimally?


Model



Model




Model



$$\frac{TRADABLE + NON-TRADABLE}{CAPITAL} \leq \lambda$$

Model



$$\min\{MtoM\ loss + Realized\ loss\}$$

$$\frac{TRADABLE + NON-TRADABLE}{CAPITAL} \leq \lambda$$

Main contribution to the literature

The optimal fire-sale deleveraging satisfies the leverage ratio with the equality (also when the price impact is non-linear)

- Strictly decreasing loss function


$$\min\{MtoM \text{ loss} + \text{Realized loss}\}$$

- On a convex set

$$\frac{\text{TRADABLE} + \text{NON-TRADABLE}}{\text{CAPITAL}} \leq \lambda$$

$$\frac{\text{TRADABLE} + \text{NON-TRADABLE}}{\text{CAPITAL}} = \lambda \quad \rightarrow$$

OPTIMAL DELEVERAGING
= SOLVING AN EQUATION



Comment 1

The paper would benefit from more clarity on the objective and main findings. Can you simulate scenarios which you could not simulate before?

1. Show the contribution in terms of algorithm

- Underline the main findings
- Comparison with previous methods (e.g. Cont & Schaanning (2016))

2. Show the contribution in terms of scenario

- Work on scenarios with macro variables
- Spell out clear examples
- Compare them with history/EBA results

Comment 2

Scenario assumptions could be improved:

- 1. Scenario impact on the banking sector.** Current set-up: Shocks to real estate prices affect directly the value of loan book.
 - Suggestion: Impact via provisions
- 2. Scenario generation.** Current set-up: covariance matrix of real estate prices used to infer correlation of shocks across banks/exposures
 - Suggestion: Use unemployment rate/macro variables (current datasets has very few commercial property price series)

Comment 3

Exposures of CR used in the datasets

- Total Corporates exposure in T; breakdown in NT
- Loans to public sector are T. How liquid are loans to the general government?
- Loans to financial corporations (channel would be different, vial liabilities of other banks)


T = Tradable, NT = Non-Tradable

(STA/IRB) Loan book exposures definitions in EBA 2016	
T	Central banks and central governments
T	Regional governments or local authorities
T	Public sector entities
T	Multilateral Development Banks
T	International Organisations
	Central banks
T	General governments
	Institutions
T	Credit institutions
T	Other financial corporations
T	Corporates
NT	Corporates - Specialised Lending
NT	Corporates - SME
	Retail
NT	Retail - Secured by real estate property
NT	Retail - Secured by real estate property - SME
NT	Retail - Secured by real estate property - Non SME
NT	Retail - Qualifying Revolving
	Retail - Other
NT	Retail - Other - SME
NT	Retail - Other - Non SME
NT	Retail - SME
NT	Households
NT	Secured by mortgages on immovable property
	Secured by mortgages on immovable property - SME
T	Equity
T	Securitisation
	Other non-credit obligation assets
	Items associated with particularly high risk
T	Covered bonds
NT	Claims on institutions and corporates with a ST credit assessment
	Collective investments undertakings (CIU)

Comment 4

Across scenarios the average initial loss is very close to the increase of provisions under the adverse scenario 2016.

Is this a finding or something linked to boundary conditions of the algorithm?



Comment 5

- **Covariance of asset prices determined only by deleveraging of banks:** no further spillovers due to other factors. E.g. fire sales of loans to Tesla might have an impact on Panasonic.
- **Regulatory requirements are an additional binding constraint only, do not affect portfolio reallocation.** The only risk measure factor affecting the deleveraging order is the volatility of prices: deleveraging order depends on
$$\frac{\text{Average daily volumes}}{\text{volatility of asset class} * \sqrt{\text{liquidation period}}}$$
- **Assumption of efficient allocation at t0**