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Supervisory policy stimulus: evidence
from the euro area dividend
recommendation

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Abstract

At the onset of the Covid-19 outbreak, central banks and supervisors introduced dividend restrictions as a new policy instrument aimed at supporting lending to the real economy and strengthening banks' capacity to absorb losses. In this paper we estimate the impact of the ECB's dividend recommendation on bank lending and risk-taking. To address identification issues, we rely on credit registry data and a direct measure that captures variation in compliance with the recommendation across banks in the euro area. The analysis disentangles the confounding effects stemming from the wide range of monetary and fiscal policies that supported credit during the Covid-19 downturn and investigates their interaction with the dividend recommendation. We find that dividend restrictions have been an effective policy in supporting financially constrained firms, adding capital space to banks, and limiting procyclical behaviour. The effects on lending are larger for small and medium enterprises and for firms operating in Covid-19 vulnerable sectors. At the same time, we do not find evidence of a significant increase in lending to riskier borrowers and "zombie" firms.

Keywords: Dividend restrictions, Supervisory policy, Credit supply, European Central Bank, Covid-19

JEL classification: E5, E51, G18, G21

Non-technical Summary

In March 2020, the European Central Bank recommended that, at least until October 2020, “significant institution” exercise extreme prudence on dividend distributions. We investigate the recommendation’s impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations amid the Covid-19 economic shock. Bank managements faced a choice of capital allocation when deciding whether to follow the ECB recommendation, with differing implications for the credit supply. On the one hand, given constant demand and price effects, they might have opted to use the surplus capital to increase lending supply, thus responding countercyclically to support the economy. On the other hand, they might have decided to increase their resilience to future shocks by saving capital, and/or strengthening their loss-absorption capacity by making additional provisions. The paper asks whether the ECB’s dividend recommendation led to an increase or a decrease in the credit supply to non-financial corporations, and whether this effect varied for different types of firms and sectors. The study compares the credit supply of banks affected by the ECB recommendation with a group of unaffected banks, and controls for other pandemic-related support measures. To address identification issues, we rely on credit registry data and a direct measure that captures differences in compliance with the dividend recommendation across banks in the euro area. The analysis disentangles the confounding effects stemming from the wide range of monetary and fiscal policies that supported credit during the Covid-19 downturn and investigates their interaction with the dividend recommendation. We find that dividend restrictions have been an effective policy in supporting financially constrained firms, adding capital space to banks, and restricting procyclical behaviour. In particular, the study finds that in average complying banks’ credit supply to non-financial corporations was on average 2.2 percentage points stronger. The effects on lending are larger for small and medium enterprises and for firms operating in sectors that were exposed to the effects of Covid-19. We also find evidence that the dividend recommendation has sustained bank lending even in the absence of government guarantees. At the same time, we do not find evidence of a significant increase in lending to riskier borrowers and “zombie” firms.

1 Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has prompted governments and central banks to implement innovative policy solutions to support the real economy. One of the main innovations was the introduction of policies to restrict dividend distributions, [Svoronos and Vrbaski \(2020\)](#). In Europe, the Banking Supervision arm of the European Central Bank (ECB) has adopted a dividend *recommendation* policy, urging but not obliging banks, to refrain from distributing dividends. The objective of the recommendation was to ensure that credit institutions would continue to fund households, small and medium-sized corporations amid the Covid-19 economic shock, and strengthen their capacity to absorb losses.¹ To our knowledge, there is no historical precedent or regulation recommending banks not to distribute dividends, nor is there any regulation informing investors that their dividends can be forgone at the favour of banks' portfolio expansion or capital conservation.

When banks' managers decide to follow the ECB recommendation (henceforth 'the recommendation'), they face a choice in capital allocation. On the one hand, they can opt to use the surplus capital to increase lending supply, thus acting countercyclically, [Gambacorta et al. \(2023\)](#). On the other hand, they can choose to increase their resilience to future shocks by saving capital or strengthen their current loss absorption capacity by setting aside loan loss provisions. In this study, we focus on credit allocation and estimate how effective the dividend recommendation was in: i) promoting lending to non-financial corporations, ii) allocating credit towards firms in most vulnerable sectors, and iii) limiting riskier lending.²

To identify the effects we exploit a quasi-natural experiment, [LaLonde \(1986\)](#), [Angrist \(1990\)](#), [Card \(1990\)](#), by using the differential variation in compliance across the largest

¹On 27 March 2020, the ECB adopted the recommendation that at least until 1 October 2020 no significant institutions should pay out dividends, and no irrevocable commitment to pay out dividends should be undertaken by the credit institutions for the financial years 2019 and 2020. This recommendation was addressed to significant institutions directly supervised by the ECB. For further information see the ECB press release from 27 March 2020 at: <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200327~d4d8f81a53.en.html>. This was followed by an EBA statement on 31 March urging "banks to follow prudent dividend and other distribution policies, including variable remuneration". Many NCAs subsequently issued their own regulatory announcements in a similar vein.

²In a technical report for euro area significant institutions, [Dautović et al. \(2021\)](#) show that the treated banks increased their loan loss provisions by around 5.5% relative to the control group, thereby strengthening their relative capacity to absorb future losses.

financial institutions in nineteen eurozone countries. Our main variable of interest is the deviation of non-distributed dividends from planned dividends distributions scaled by risk-weighted assets (RWAs), which is a measure of the intensity of treatment. We combine the ECB survey with a confidential euro area wide dataset on monetary and fiscal policy stimuli targeted at sustaining lending during the Covid-19 crisis.³

To disentangle loan demand and loan supply effects, we rely on granular credit registry data and a confidential measure on planned but non-distributed dividends due to the recommendation. This information was collected via confidential surveys with banks by the ECB supervisory arm and captures the variation in compliance with the recommendation across banks in the euro area. It is the finest possible data source to precisely identify the amount of non-distributed dividends due to the policy.

Our main finding is that that dividend restrictions have been a particularly effective policy in supporting non-financial-corporates. The effects are particularly strong on lending to small and medium enterprises and to Covid-19 vulnerable sectors. At the same time, we do not find evidence of a significant increase in lending to riskier borrowers or "zombie" enterprises or increased risk-taking by banks with structurally high non-performing loans (NPLs).

The idea of restricting dividend payments is not completely new. Recent literature has argued for banking sector-wide dividend restrictions in downturns, [Forti and Schiozer \(2015\)](#), [Ashraf et al. \(2016\)](#). Empirical evidence shows that in times of crisis banks tend to not decrease dividend distribution, [Saunders and Wilson \(2020\)](#), expand them [Acharya et al. \(2012\)](#), to signal capital and liquidity strength in bad states, [Kauko \(2012\)](#), [Abreu and Gulamhussen \(2013\)](#), [Wu \(2018\)](#). From the perspective of who bears the default risk, dividend payouts in crisis times are hence comparable to transfers from depositors and debt holders, in extreme cases taxpayers, to equity holders. The supervisory dividend restrictions can then be justified and timely in the face of an economic downturn to induce banks to conserve capital and provide lending to the real economy. It is worth pointing-out that dividend restrictions can have also short-term negative effects on banks' stock prices, in particular when the lifting

³[Ampudia et al. \(2023\)](#) also provide evidence on the impact of the recommendation on selected aggregates (bank lending, bank valuations, dividend expectations).

of restrictions is uncertain, see for instance the recent evidence in [Andreeva et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Matyunina and Ongena \(2022\)](#), as well as previous work by [Lee \(1995\)](#).⁴

More generally, dividends are considered as the most important form of payout and enterprises tend to distribute a substantial percentage of their earnings as dividends, [Allen and Michaely \(1995\)](#). For the case of euroarea banks, [Figure 1](#) illustrates the cumulative planned dividend distributions prior to the ECB recommendation and the compliance with the policy. It shows that the payout ratio out of fiscal year 2019 earnings is 45.1% (if we consider positive dividend distribution plans only, the payout ratio increases to 56.7% of FY2019 earnings). Planned but non-distributed dividends by the 110 significant euro area banks under the ECB supervision amounted to €11.8 billion for the fiscal year 2019.⁵ In terms of regulatory capital, this amount can be seen as an additional 47 basis points of risk-weighted common equity that banks can use for credit supply, loan loss provisions and capital increase during the Covid-19 crisis. If all undistributed dividends were allocated to lending, the potential overall effect can be seen through the lending multiplier-effect within a risk-based capital framework. In the case of the euro area, the undistributed €11.8 billion of dividends in 2020, if fully used to supply lending, can finance up to €141 billion in new assets for the real economy.⁶

The study of the impact of dividend taxation is receiving growing attention in the empirical corporate finance literature. Broadly speaking, we can think of central bank dividend restrictions as a temporary 100% tax *increase* on dividends, which would discourage banks to distribute them, and thus create a surplus liquidity for alternative capital allocations.

⁴See Table 1 in [Abreu and Gulamhussein \(2013\)](#) for a summary of the empirical evidence on dividend payout policies and stock prices.

⁵The following criteria are applied to determine if a bank is a significant institution and hence should be directly supervised by the ECB and not by the national competent authorities (NCAs) : 1) Size: the total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion; 2) Economic importance for the specific country or the EU economy as a whole; 3) Cross-border activities: the total value of its assets exceeds €5 billion and the ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating eurozone member state to its total assets/liabilities is above 20%; 4) Direct public financial assistance: the bank has requested or received funding from the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility; 5) A supervised bank can also be considered significant if it is one of the three most significant banks established in a particular country. For the full definition of eurozone significant institutions see: <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/criteria/html/index.en.html>.

⁶This calculation is performed holding the average regulatory capital ratio, and risk-weights, of euro area banks fixed at the end of 2019. For ECB banking supervision data, see the publicly available statistics at: <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/statistics/html/index.en.html>.

The dividend taxation literature generally focuses on impact evaluations of dividend tax *cuts* on: capital allocation [Becker et al. \(2013\)](#), employment and productivity [Jacob \(2021\)](#), firm leverage [Lin and Flannery \(2013\)](#), mergers and acquisitions [Ohrn and Seegert \(2019\)](#), dividend payments [Chetty and Saez \(2005\)](#), investment policies [Isakov et al. \(2021\)](#), and equity issuance [Moon \(2022\)](#). Most recently, [Boissel and Matray \(2021\)](#) investigate the effects of a three-fold dividend tax *increase* in France, and found that the extra liquidity created by the tax led to higher investments.

Our study contributes to the nascent literature on the impact of *easing* supervisory policies. We complement the empirical evidence on the impact of releases in capital requirements on lending showing that banks tend to increase loan supply after a release of requirements, [Jiménez et al. \(2017\)](#), [Imbierowicz et al. \(2018\)](#), [Sivec and Volk \(2022\)](#), [Couaillier et al. \(2022b\)](#).⁷

While [Dautović et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Martínez-Miera and Vegas \(2021\)](#) provide initial evidence on the recommendation, they respectively fail to control for unobserved firm credit demand effects, and simultaneous policy interventions by monetary and fiscal authorities. Our study aims to fill those gaps and add evidence to this literature using a unique proprietary measure of compliance with the recommendation, which is the best possible source of measuring the discrepancy between planned and eventually distributed dividends after the announcement of the policy.

To estimate the effect of the dividend recommendation on lending behaviour during the Covid-19 pandemic, several empirical challenges must be overcome. First, the econometric framework needs to account for shifts in enterprises' credit demand, which may be affected by emergency liquidity needs during the pandemic. We address this issue by exploiting multiple bank-relationships and borrower-time fixed effects, as in [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#), as well

⁷It is worth noting that from a welfare perspective, restricting dividend distributions to generate additional lending is superior to easing capital requirements. The latter measure indeed does not increase banks' loss absorption capacity, [Imbierowicz et al. \(2018\)](#). Therefore, from a policy perspective restricting dividends can be more effective in supporting the real economy, particularly when combined with a regulatory capital release. Moreover, in a modelling framework, [Muñoz \(2021\)](#) and [Fischer and Kessler \(2022\)](#) show that prudential policies on dividends can be superior to conventional macroprudential policies in smoothing the financial cycle and providing additional welfare gains.

as industry-location-size fixed effects estimator (ILS FE), similar to the approach used by [Acharya et al. \(2019\)](#), [Degryse et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Berg et al. \(2021\)](#). This allows to control for unobserved demand effects that might confound the impact of the policy on credit supply.

The second challenge is to isolate bank credit supply shifts from pandemic-related measures. In particular, monetary policy quantitative easing, government guarantees, and moratoria schemes. Figure 2 shows the evolution of monetary and fiscal policy measures before and after the pandemic with a surge of policy support in banks' balance sheet visible from 2020Q1. Monetary policy relaxed funding conditions to banks. [Altavilla et al. \(2020\)](#) show that in the absence of the third wave of the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operation (TLTRO) lending to enterprises would have been 3 percentage points lower, we confirm those finding in Section 4. Meanwhile, government guarantees on new loans helped enterprises to obtain funds to roll over liquidity and working capital needs, [Falagiarda et al. \(2020\)](#), [Bachas et al. \(2021\)](#), [Altavilla et al. \(2021\)](#), [Jiménez et al. \(2022\)](#); while moratoria on debt repayments have been widely use to mitigate liquidity concerns of households and enterprises, [Budnik et al. \(2021\)](#), [Gaffney et al. \(2022\)](#).

Two additional factors that can further affect credit supply are capital releases and drawn credit lines. Although credit lines are booked off-balance sheet, when firms draw on them, they are moved on-balance sheet and increase lending and RWA, [Greenwald et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Kapan and Minoiu \(2021\)](#). Figure 3 shows that after the onset of the pandemic, these two forces were also at play in sustaining lending growth.

Third, we need to factor in the temporary and exceptional nature of the recommendation, which might have led banks to save the non-distributed dividends for future times when the ECB would lift the recommendation, and hence decide not to use this capital to support lending.⁸ Disentangling the inter-temporal allocation of surplus capital is challenging, as it underscores the importance of permanent versus temporary nature of policy reforms. For instance, Figure 1 shows that as of March 2020, more than half of the not yet distributed dividends were planned to be distributed in 2021. The inter-temporal optimisation of divi-

⁸See the ECB press release of 28 July 2020 at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200728_1-42a74a0b86.en.html

dend distributions would be in line with dividend smoothing theories, [Lintner \(1956\)](#), [Allen and Michaely \(1995\)](#), [Larkin et al. \(2017\)](#), [Koussis and Makrominas \(2019\)](#), and with the signalling theory, where managers might aim to preserve the equity value of the firm to signal bank quality, [Boldin and Leggett \(1995\)](#), [Abreu and Gulamhussen \(2013\)](#), [Wu \(2018\)](#), [Muñoz \(2021\)](#) and hence optimise inter-temporally payouts of already earmarked resources for dividends. Similarly, the positive impact on lending is uncertain since banks can put market discipline as a priority in uncertain times and use non-distributed dividends to strengthen their solvency positions, [Matyunina and Ongena \(2022\)](#).

To strengthen our analysis and overcome these challenges, we have access to a range of proprietary data which we use to perform inference on banks' behaviour. This helps us to overcome the problem of omitted variables and limits estimation biases. To control for the confounding effects of monetary policy measures on lending, we match the euro area credit registry data (*AnaCredit*) with bank-firm level information on payment moratoria and government guarantees schemes. We also merge *Anacredit* with the ECB dataset on TLTROs, and we use the amount of deposits held by commercial banks at the ECB as a measure of the take-up of Asset Purchase Programs (APPs) and Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP).⁹ TLTROs, APPs and the PEPP constitute the main components of the ECB quantitative easing.¹⁰

With respect to fiscal policies, we control for both government guarantees and moratoria on loans, which aimed to support banks' provision of credit. To isolate their effects from our coefficients of interest, we further match the dataset with confidential supervisory data on the *uptake* of government guarantees programs and moratoria by financial institutions. The richness of our data allows us to examine the interactions between the government guarantees and the dividend recommendation policies. Finally, we add supervisory bank-level balance sheet data to control for bank-specific characteristics such as size, profitability, asset quality,

⁹See [Copeland et al. \(2021\)](#); [Demiralp et al. \(2021\)](#); [Ryan and Whelan \(2021\)](#) for a similar approach on asset purchases. The amount of deposits held by commercial banks at the central bank also serves as a measure of the costs that a negative interest rate policy imposes on each financial institution, [Heider et al. \(2019\)](#), [Bubeck et al. \(2020\)](#).

¹⁰For an overview of ECB asset purchase programs before and during the Covid-19 pandemic see: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/app/html/index.en.html>

off-balance sheet exposures, funding, risk profile and distance from the minimum capital requirements. Including these variables in the empirical specification is crucial for limit the bias of our estimates, as planned dividends and credit supply growth are correlated with banks' characteristics.

Another factor that facilitates the accurate identification of our estimates is the unexpected nature of the pandemic. We work on the assumption that the recommendation could not have been anticipated by banks since the Covid-19 shock was exogenous to their financial and lending decisions. In other words, the dividend recommendation was not foreseen by banks in late 2019 when dividend plans were drawn. Therefore, we regard the distribution plans as pre-determined to the policy decision, and thus not affected by it, excluding concerns regarding endogeneity that may arise from anticipation effects. Taken together, these elements enable us to design a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the actual effects of the dividend restriction policy on lending.

Our results show an overall positive effect of the dividend recommendation on credit supply. In our baseline specification a 1 percentage point (p.p.) increase of the ratio of non-distributed but planned dividends over RWAs is estimated to have contributed to an additional lending growth of around 4.4 p.p.. To understand the economic significance of these effects note that, conditional on the 53 banks that did not follow their plan, the average ratio of non-distributed but planned dividends over RWAs is 0.47% (ranging from -0.05% to 2.34%, with a p05-p95 range of 0.15%-1.05%). This indicates that, in the absence of the ECB policy, lending growth would have been 2.1 p.p. lower.¹¹

From a general equilibrium perspective, our findings can have important implications. Recent evidence from [Bräuer et al. \(2022\)](#) shows that investors' consumption is planned and excessively sensitive around dividend distribution dates suggesting that a dividend restriction policy can effectively move resources from planned shareholders' consumption to credit

¹¹Evidence of the effects of ECB recommendation for the case of Spain is also provided by [Martínez-Miera and Vegas \(2021\)](#). The authors analysed credit registry data and found larger effects on credit supply, ranging from 11.9% to 14.5%. However, these large point estimates may be the result of not controlling for the simultaneity of unprecedented monetary and fiscal policies which are all statistically and economically significant in our specifications.

growth, which might have a higher multiplier effect during a downturn.

The effect is more pronounced for medium and small enterprises (+2.1p.p. and +2.7 p.p., respectively). Of particular importance, for sectors vulnerable to the Covid-19 lock-downs, the effect is 2.9 p.p. stronger. Moreover, the dividend recommendation sustains bank lending even in the absence of government guarantees (+1.5 to +1.9 p.p.). It is worth noting that government guarantees and dividend restrictions act as complements in supporting lending growth.

The effects remain similar when controlling for bank risk-taking. We fail to reject the hypothesis of null credit growth to more problematic "zombie" borrowers, defined as firms with impaired loans above the 95th percentile in a firm-bank relationship. Similarly, we find evidence that banks with structurally high NPL ratios take less risk. Furthermore, we find that the impact of the recommendation is mostly short-lived and does not have significant persistent effects: the beneficial impact vanishes in 2020Q4 and it is mainly concentrated in 2020Q3.

After introducing the ILS FE to analyse also the enterprises with a single bank relationship, the results remain robust. However, the estimates are approximately one third lower, indicating that the bulk of the positive impact is detected for enterprises with multiple bank credit relationships. Validation tests show that the reduction of the impact is entirely driven by the *non-significant* effect of enterprises with a single relationship. The absence of a positive impact of dividend recommendation on single credit relationship enterprises is probably due to their smaller size as 77.4% of single relationship enterprises are micro enterprises with no market power, limited economies of scale and lower collateral value. To further corroborate the findings, we run the ILS FE estimator separately on a multi-relationship sample to find same magnitudes of point estimates as in the baseline [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) estimator.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and some stylised facts. Section 3 presents the empirical design, while Section 4 shows the results, Section 5 checks the validity of the results using a battery of robustness tests. The final section concludes with some policy considerations.

2 Data and stylised facts

2.1 Data Sources

In Table A1 in the Annex, we report a detailed definition of the variables employed in the analyses and their data sources. The data on dividend distribution plans and their effective disbursement were collected by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the supervisory arm of the ECB, through confidential surveys in 2020 aimed at monitoring compliance with the policy. This represents a unique data source for assessing the impact of dividend restrictions in the euro area. Through the survey, we can directly observe banks' distribution plans prior to and after the Covid-19 shock.

The main survey we use in the paper was conducted in the first quarter of 2020. All surveys versions requested banks to report their dividend distribution plans for 2020 prior to the ECB recommendation and their expected compliance with it. Of particular interest to this study, banks were asked to report the amount of dividends planned to be distributed in 2020, the amount cancelled, and the amount, if any, already distributed. Figure 1 gives an aggregate view of dividend plans and the compliance with the ECB recommendation by the banks in the euro area.

Dividend distribution plans are generally based on previous fiscal year's profits. In the case of the ECB recommendation, they were therefore decided by banks' executive boards in late 2019, or early 2020. Nevertheless, following the ECB recommendation, in most cases banks had not yet distributed their dividends, i.e. the effective dividends distributed in 2020 deviated from the planned ones for most banks. In our sample, 75 out of 110 banks were planning dividend payments for 2020. Among those, 53 banks followed the recommendation completely and did not pay dividends, representing thus our main treatment group.¹² One bank distributed marginally more than planned, and 11 banks distributed all that they planned for 2020 because either they had already distributed their dividends before 27 March 2020, when the ECB issued the recommendation, or after because their boards had already

¹²In our dataset, this variation of compliance implies that around 60% of observations are linked to banks that deviated from their initial distribution plans and are thus assigned to the treated group of observations.

approved the disbursement and were legally obliged to distribute dividends to shareholders. This latter group forms our main control group, along with the 35 banks that did not plan to distribute any dividends and hence were not affected by the recommendation.

The bank-level balance sheet data, as well as common equity capital requirements are gathered from ECB Supervisory Statistics. Information on TLTRO take-up is drawn from the ECB market operations database. We match bank-level data with loan-level information from *AnaCredit*, the euro area credit register of the European System of Central Banks which contains information on all individual bank loans to enterprises with an outstanding amount above €25,000.¹³ *AnaCredit* includes information on key bank and borrower characteristics such as credit volumes, loan rates, firm location, firm size and firm sector. Importantly, *AnaCredit* collects unique data on the collateral received for each loan contract which allows us to identify whether the loan is subject to a public guarantee.¹⁴ Furthermore, we can identify which loan is benefiting from a payment moratorium by using information on loan maturity dates at origination and checking whether these are extended following the pandemic outbreak. The data are collected by the ECB in a harmonised manner from the national central banks of the Eurosystem to ensure consistency across countries.

2.2 Descriptive Statistics

Our sample covers quarterly data from 2019Q1 to 2021Q1. It includes five quarters prior to the ECB recommendation from March 2020, and four quarters following it. After matching the different data sources we obtain an estimation sample of 6,360,304 observations in the multiple firm-bank relationship sample, and 11,363,790 when single firm-bank relationships are added in the ILS specification. In total the matched estimation sample covers 99 banks directly supervised by the SSM.

¹³ *AnaCredit* is the analytical credit register of the Eurosystem and additional documentation can be found here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money_credit_banking/anacredit/html/index.en.html

¹⁴ Covid-19 guaranteed loans have been identified by using registry information - e.g. LEIs and Register of Institutions and Affiliates Data (RIAD) codes - of the promotional lenders charged with this task in each country (for example, ICO in Spain, KfW in Germany, BPI in France and SACE/Fondo di Garanzia in Italy). In addition to the registry information of the guarantor, the starting date of the public guarantee scheme has also been used as an identifying device.

In Figure 4 we report the distribution of our variable of interest (Dividends/RWA) in the baseline bank-firm multiple relationship sample: 41.3% of observations refer to banks without any dividend distribution plans for 2020 or banks that distributed the whole amount of planned dividend payouts for 2020, this is our control group since those banks are not affected by the ECB recommendation. The remaining 58.7% of observations refer to banks that had planned to distribute dividends prior to the pandemic but followed the ECB recommendation suspending or cancelling dividend distributions in 2020. This is our treatment group and encompasses 53 banks that did not distribute any dividend out of the planned, i.e. fully compliant with the recommendation, and 11 banks that distribute a portion of what they planned, i.e. partially compliant. The unconditional average of Dividends/RWA is 0.14%; conditional on being treated the average is 0.47% of RWA which ranges from -0.05% (one bank that distributed more than planned) to 2.34% of RWA with a 5th-95th percentile range of 0.15%-1.05%.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the analysis with multiple firm-bank relationships. Specifically, Panel A reports information on the variables we observe at bank-firm variation, while Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables. In Panel A, it is interesting to focus on the main variables that might affect loan growth. We note that the take-up of guaranteed loans has been significantly higher than for loans under moratoria. The share of bank-firm credit relationships benefiting from a government guarantee averages to 10.3% versus 0.3% of the share of debt under moratoria. In Panel B, we note that the TLTROs III uptake is not negligible as shown by its average ratio over total assets (6.7%). A more dynamic picture of the main control variables associated with the monetary and fiscal policy stimuli is provided in Figure 2 illustrating the increase in those measures just after the end of 2020 Q1.

As mentioned in Section 1, the surge in lending growth is also driven by heterogeneity in credit demand across enterprises and a combination of supervisory measures and credit line draw-downs that are booked off-balance sheet. These effects manifested themselves strongly in March 2020 and should be controlled for when assessing the impact of the dividend rec-

ommendation. Figure 3 shows the movement of off-balance sheet exposures and supervisory capital buffer releases in Europe.

We also examine the descriptive statistics of our endogenous variable (lending growth). Figure 5 shows the co-movement of credit growth and the planned but non-distributed dividends scaled by RWA. It is noteworthy that lending increased in the quarter following the pandemic outbreak, with an *unconditional* average of 18.1%, before declining monotonically in the subsequent quarters. As expected, the amount of non-distributed dividends over RWA also spiked immediately after the ECB recommendation, remaining persistent until the end of 2020 at 0.24%.

3 Empirical Design

Our identification strategy exploits variation in the compliance with the recommendation to investigate its effectiveness in stimulating credit growth. We use credit registry data aggregated at the bank-firm relationship and control for the heterogeneity in credit demand at firm level using firm-time fixed effects to isolate credit supply effects. The exogeneity of the Covid-19 shock coupled with the variation in compliance with the recommendation suggests a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) research design. Importantly, the timing of the policy, announced on 27 March 2020 by the ECB, just four days before the first quarter 2020 reporting date, helps to mitigate measurement errors on reported figures by policies that are activated in between two reporting quarters. Our main variable of interest is the planned but non-distributed dividends over RWA (Dividends/RWA), as such we have a continuous treatment variable for the treatment group which allows for an interpretation based on the intensity of treatment. Throughout our analysis, all variables are winsorised at 1%-99% levels to avoid potential issues with outliers.

The DiD approach requires several assumptions to hold. First, assignment of the treatment has to be exogenous. Plausibly, in our empirical setting, satisfying this assumption is reasonable for three main reasons: i) the Covid-19 pandemic is widely recognised as an unan-

anticipated exogenous shock to the economy and hence the recommendation could not have been anticipated by banks when drafting their dividend distribution plans; ii) the decision on dividends to be distributed in 2020 is pre-determined to the Covid-19 shock since it was decided in FY2019; *and* iii) we do not have banks in our sample that did not follow the ECB recommendation, except for five banks that had already approved the disbursement of dividends at their shareholders' meeting and hence had legal pre-commitments to disburse them. In the robustness checks Section (5) we conduct a test for those five banks.

A further caveat is in order: the DiD approach is valid under the parallel trend assumption whereby, in absence of treatment, changes in the outcome variable post-treatment would be the same in both the treatment and the control groups, [Bertrand et al. \(2004\)](#) and [Imbens and Wooldridge \(2009\)](#). While a formal test for this assumption is difficult to construct, Figure 6 shows the trends in the average bank-firm lending growth for the treatment and control groups in the period before the ECB March 2020 recommendation (i.e. 2019 Q2 - 2020 Q1). While the trends are not perfectly parallel, it is apparent that the two were moving in the same direction each quarter before the Covid-19 outbreak. This suggests that the parallel trend assumption prior to the policy could be considered broadly satisfied.

3.1 Bank-firm level analysis

To shed light on bank lending behaviour in response to the ECB recommendation we start by examining whether banks that planned to distribute dividends prior to the pandemic increased their lending behaviour during the shock. Our baseline specification follows [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) and includes enterprises with multiple bank relationships to control for firm credit demand shifts with borrower-time fixed effects.¹⁵

Our main variable of interest is the ratio of dividends planned in FY2019 but not distributed in 2020 over RWAs. This measure allows for an interpretation of results in line with

¹⁵In a robustness check in Section 5.1, we provide variation of our baseline specification by replacing borrower-time fixed effects with industry-location-size-time fixed effects and including thus also single bank relationship firms in the estimation sample. In a further robustness check in Section 5.2 we remove banks that did not plan to distribute dividends already prior to the recommendation and keep only banks with ex-ante positive dividend plans.

the regulatory capital. Formally, the baseline specification relies on the following regression:

$$LendingGr_{f,b,t} = \beta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t} \quad (1)$$

where $LendingGrowth_{f,b,t}$ is the growth of the credit stock granted by bank b to firm f in quarter t . Our main variable $Dividends/RWA$ is at bank-level, and β is our coefficient of interest showing whether banks that planned but did not distribute dividends lent more following the recommendation in comparison to the control group of banks. Note that $Dividends/RWA$ is a continuous variable and captures the intensity of the effect.

To control for possible heterogeneity among banks that can affect lending behaviour, we employ a large set of bank-level variables ($X_{b,t-1}$). Following [Fama and French \(2001\)](#) we start by including characteristics for size (the logarithm of total assets); and profitability (annualised net interest margin on a rolling quarterly basis). We also include the ratio of debt securities to total assets (Mkt debt funding/TA) to capture differences in bank funding structure; the risk weight density (RWA/TA), defined as the ratio between risk weighted assets and total original exposures, to account for the riskiness of banks' assets; the non-performing loans ratio (NPL ratio), computed as the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, to control for the asset quality of the loan portfolio; the CET1 ratio distance to the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA)¹⁶ to control for bank solvency and to capture capital buffer usability constraints (CET1 MDA Distance); the ratio of cash (including cash held at the central bank) to total assets (Cash at CB/TA) to measure bank liquidity conditions and the take-up of quantitative easing, and the ratio of off-balance sheet activities to total assets (Off-balance sheet/TA) to account for credit lines drawdowns that were prominent during the outbreak of the pandemic and that affected bank lending, [Greenwald et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Kapan and Minoiu \(2021\)](#). Finally, we introduce loan loss provisions to total assets

¹⁶The MDA is a limit on dividend distribution that decreases linearly when a bank's capital level falls below the regulatory minimum capital requirement. In other words, the distance from the MDA explains the amount of capital a bank has to expand its assets.

(Provisions/TA) to control for the possibility that banks with lower levels of loan loss provisions used non-distributed dividends to strengthen their solvency positions. All bank-specific control variables are lagged by one quarter to limit endogeneity issues.

A crucial aspect of our estimates is that we control at the bank-firm level for the wide range of policy interventions introduced in the course of 2020. The term $\Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1}$ captures the impact of measures such as the share of loans under moratoria (Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria) and guarantees (Share of Loan Guarantees) on firms' creditworthiness and banks' lending incentives. Additionally, we include the ratio of TLTRO III uptake over total assets at the bank level (TLTRO) to control for the impact of "unconventional" monetary policy actions.

We gradually saturate the model with borrower-time and bank fixed effects. We introduce borrower-time fixed-effect ($\eta_{f,t}$) to account for the heterogeneity in credit demand across enterprises, and to absorb time varying firm characteristics that may impact credit demand. The bank fixed effects (ρ_b) capture all unobservable time-invariant bank characteristics. Importantly, with bank fixed effects we also capture the *average* differences in credit growth across banks before the shock. Moreover, since our main variable of interest is rather stable over time but only changes for the treated group after 2020Q2 (see Figure 1), bank fixed-effects help to more precisely identify the source of variation for identifying the impact of the dividend recommendation. All standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-firm level.

In a complementary set of specifications, we investigate whether the supervisory dividend stimulus is directed to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) or towards Covid-19 affected sectors. Here, our econometric specifications take the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \beta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \gamma Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times Micro_{f,t} + \\
 & + \delta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times Small_{f,t} + \\
 & + \phi Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times Medium_{f,t} + \\
 & + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t}
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \beta Dividends/RW A_{b,t} + \\
& + \theta Dividends/RW A_{b,t} \times Vulnerable Sectors_f + \\
& + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

In Equation 2, we define firm size according to the Anacredit registry, which distinguishes between large, medium, small and micro enterprises using the EU Commission standard classification.¹⁷ Note that our reference group is the *large* firms, those that employ more than 250 employees, with an annual turnover greater than EUR 50 million *and* an annual balance sheet greater than EUR 43 million.

To classify the industrial sectors in Equation 3, we use the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2) code.¹⁸ The vulnerable industry sectors are therefore based on 2-digit NACE codes. Specifically, the *Vulnerable Sectors* dummy takes the value 1 for Section F (Construction), Section G (Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles), Section H (Transportation and storage), Section I (Accommodation and food services activities), Section R (Arts, entertainment and recreation) and Section C (Manufacturing) of the NACE Rev. 2 classification, and 0 otherwise.

¹⁷See the SME definition of the EU Commission at this link https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/sme-definition_en. In accordance with this definition, we use the following dummy variables to classify enterprise size: *Micro* is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for enterprises that employ fewer than 10 employees and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million, and 0 otherwise. *Small* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for enterprises that employ fewer than 50 employees and have an annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total that does not exceed EUR 10 million, and 0 otherwise. *Medium* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for enterprises that employ less than 250 but more than 50 employees, have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million, and 0 otherwise.

¹⁸NACE Rev. 2 classification is based on a hierarchical structure, which consists of first level sections (alphabetical code), second level divisions (2-digit numerical code), third level groups (3-digit numerical code), and fourth level classes (4-digit numerical code). For more information, refer to [EU Commission NACE classification](#).

4 Empirical Results

Table 2 reports the results for our baseline multiple bank relationship specification from Equation 1 in Columns (1) and (2), while the results from estimating Equations 2 and 3 are reported in Columns (3) and (4) and Columns (5) and (6), respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-firm level in each econometric specification.¹⁹

We find a positive, statistically significant and robust relationship between *Dividends/RWA* and credit growth. Ceteris paribus, a 1 p.p. increase of non-distributed but planned dividends over RWAs ratio resulted in additional lending growth of 4.3-4.4 p.p., depending on the specification. This is our main finding showing the dividend recommendation being effective in supporting bank lending supply to non-financial corporations amid the Covid-19 crisis. The impact is strong and higher than usual elasticities found in the banking capital literature which however is mostly focused on normal times and on *increases* in bank capital requirements rather than capital releases, [Boissay et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Gambacorta et al. \(2023\)](#). It is important to note that an increase in non-distributed dividends is equivalent to a direct increase in bank's capital base that can be used to generate new lending activity. Moreover, a closer look at our data indicates that a 1 percentage increase in Dividends/RWA represents a significant change. Dividends/RWA has an average of 0.14% and a standard deviation of 0.27%. Therefore, a 1 pp increase in Dividend/RWA corresponds to a 4 standard deviation shock.

Our results can also be compared with other studies that analyse situation of capital releases in a crisis period, where multipliers are typically higher. For instance, [Martínez-Miera and Vegas \(2021\)](#) find an impact of 11.9 - 14.5% for the recommendation using only the Spanish sub-sample of banks. Our findings seem also more conservative than other studies that investigate special cases of bank capital releases, typically under stress scenarios. [Jiménez et al. \(2017\)](#) find an increase in lending of 9 p.p. for a 1 p.p. release of capital in the Spanish case of dynamic provisioning. [Sivec and Volk \(2022\)](#) find that in Slovenia the

¹⁹Table A2 in the Annex reports robustness of baseline results by using alternative clustering of standard errors.

impact of risk-weighted capital release was 11 p.p., while for the euro area-wide capital release [Couaillier et al. \(2022b\)](#) find a 1.2-2.7% impact on lending levels.

Previous research ([Acharya et al. \(2012\)](#); [Forti and Schiozer \(2015\)](#); [Muñoz \(2021\)](#)) has documented that, during the global financial crisis, costly signalling, combined with accumulating losses, eroded banks' capital and impaired their lending capacity. We propose four reasons to explain why supervisory policies aimed at restricting dividend distributions facilitate bank lending supply in a downturn. First, retaining dividends adds an additional layer of *new* CET1 capital, allowing banks to expand their loan portfolios without breaching regulatory requirements. In other terms, by adding additional CET1 capital above requirements the distance from capital requirements (capital space) is enlarged, limiting forms of procyclical behaviour. Second, a dividend restriction may strengthen the effectiveness of other standard and risk-weighted regulatory capital releases since banks may opt to use those to disburse dividends to shareholders. Restricting dividend distributions tout-court avoids this possibility. Third, the ECB recommendation hinders dividend smoothing by banks during a downturn. Banks have an incentive to use these resources most efficiently to increase profitability and generate interest income. Fourth, there is a strong interaction with the presence of government guaranteed credit and the recommendation. As it will be shown in [Section 4.1](#), for the standard case of the non-government-guaranteed loans that is studied in the literature, the impact of the recommendation drops to 1.5-1.9 p.p. for a 1 p.p. increase of the Dividends/RWA ratio.

In Columns (3) and (4) of [Table 2](#), we assess whether the supervisory dividend stimulus is directed towards micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) or large enterprises. From a policy-makers' perspective, it is relatively more important to ensure the provision of credit to MSMEs during downturns since they do not rely on debt security issuance as a substitute for bank credit during time of tighten lending standards, [Becker and Ivashina \(2014\)](#) [Becker and Ivashina \(2018\)](#). Additionally, MSMEs are subject to greater lender discretion facing a disadvantage with respect to large firms when requesting credit from banks, [Chodorow-Reich et al. \(2022\)](#). Our findings indicate that banks following the recommendation on dividends

distribution lent more to small and medium enterprises than to large enterprises. Specifically, a 1 p.p. increase in *Dividends/RWA* resulted in about 1.6-2.1 p.p. and 1.8-2.7 p.p. more lending growth to medium and small enterprises, respectively. However, lending growth to micro enterprises was lower (even if not statistically significant) with respect to large enterprises. This suggest that micro enterprises are perceived as riskier and more vulnerable during periods of systemic shock such as the pandemic in line with the pecking order of liquidity to firms found in [Chodorow-Reich et al. \(2022\)](#).

We then turn to the impact of the ECB recommendation on Covid-19-affected versus less affected economic sectors. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 report the results where, as in Equation 3, we interact our variable of interest (*Dividends/RWA*) with a dummy variable identifying Covid-19-affected sectors. As shown, bank lending growth increased more to vulnerable sectors in relative terms during the pandemic outbreak: a 1p.p. increase of non-distributed but planned dividends over RWAs ratio resulted in additional lending growth to vulnerable sectors of about 2.2-2.9 p.p. suggesting that credit supply was channelled to most affected sectors.

Among the bank-specific controls, we find the expected signs on all coefficients. A positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level across specifications) relationship between the CET1 ratio distance to the MDA and bank lending growth. Greater capital headroom on top of capital requirements strengthens lending supply by banks, [Gambacorta and Shin \(2018\)](#) and [Couaillier et al. \(2022a\)](#). In line with the findings by [Altavilla et al. \(2021\)](#), we find a positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level across specifications) relationship between the share of loans under government guaranteed schemes (*Share of Loan Guarantees*) and bank lending growth. Finally, a positive and statistically significant link is also found between *TLTRO* and lending growth, [Altavilla et al. \(2020\)](#).

4.1 Interaction with government guarantees

A growing body of research documents how credit guarantee schemes supported enterprises' liquidity needs by preserving banks' incentives to lend as the credit risk is transferred to a

guarantor, usually the public sector, [Altavilla et al. \(2021\)](#), [Cascarino et al. \(2022\)](#). In fact, banks might have chosen to extend credit only on government-guaranteed loans. If this is the case, we should observe no effect of the ECB's dividends recommendation on lending to enterprises that did not receive guaranteed loans. In this section, we interact the share of guaranteed loans in a bank-firm relationship with our main variable of interest (planned but not distributed dividends) using the following econometric identification strategy:

$$\begin{aligned}
 LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \beta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \theta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times \frac{Guaranteed\ Loans}{Total\ Loans}_{f,b,t} + \\
 & + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4}$$

where $\frac{Guaranteed\ Loans}{Total\ Loans}_{f,b,t}$ is the share of guaranteed loans at the bank-firm level. Our interest in this specification focuses on the coefficient β and the interaction term θ . The coefficient β captures whether the ECB recommendation sustained also non-government-guaranteed lending. The interaction coefficient θ provides indication on whether the two measures acted as complement in supporting bank lending to non-financial corporations. The vectors $X_{b,t-1}$ and $\Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1}$, and the fixed effects are as in Equation 1.

The results reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 are important for two reasons. First, the coefficient for the reference group of non-government-guaranteed loans (*Dividends/RWA*) is positive, sizeable and statistically significant (at the 10% level) indicating that credit supply grew independently on the extension of guaranteed credit. Second, we find strong complementary between prudential policies and government support measures for credit, as the interaction term of our dividend variable and the share of government guarantees shows a positive and significant coefficient. If the ratio of non-distributed but planned dividends over RWAs increase by a 1 p.p., fully government guaranteed loans can experience additionally lending growth of 6.2-6.9pp., depending on the specification.

4.2 Interaction with capital space

In this section, we investigate how the effectiveness of the recommendation was affected by the distance from the minimum capital requirement, which indicates the capital space a bank has at disposal to distribute more loans. To assess this, we rely on the European minimum capital requirement standard and use the distance between the CET1 capital ratio and the MDA as the measure of capital space. Intuitively, banks with more capital space should be more inclined to generate loans out of the recommendation. We formally specify this test formally as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \beta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \theta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times DistanceMDA_{b,t} + \\ & + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where *Distance MDA* is a dummy for banks below the lowest quartile of the distance from the MDA trigger. The reference group of banks is those above the 25th percentile of the distance from the MDA trigger. The vectors $X_{b,t-1}$ and $\Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1}$, and the fixed effects are as in Equation 1. The results are reported in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 3.

Point estimates indicate that most, if not all, of our results are explained by banks with higher capital space. The marginal effect for banks below the 25th percentile of the distance from MDA is not statistically different from zero. While this is an expected result, from a policy standpoint, the effectiveness of the recommendation may not be the optimal outcome since not all banks choose to support the real sector. Instead, it is likely that banks close to the MDA trigger have used the non-distributed dividends to build-up much needed capital.

4.3 Interaction with firm and bank riskiness

In this section, we investigate whether banks that comply with the ECB recommendation increase risk-taking. We focus on two measures of risk-taking: i) ex-ante accumulated impairment within the bank-firm relationship, and ii) a dummy for banks with structurally higher

NPL ratios. This means that we use a proxy for riskiness at the firm level (accumulated impairments) and a proxy at the bank level (NPL ratios). With the first measure, we aim at understanding whether the increase in lending observed in Table 2 has been directed to enterprises that, already prior to the pandemic, had substantial accumulated impairments which would call for a type of "gambling for resurrection". Excessive risk-taking by banks in the form of gambling for resurrection could result in additional unforeseen losses. With the second measure we study whether banks with already deteriorated asset quality, as measured by the stock of NPLs, provide more loans out of the ECB recommendation, instead of, for instance, accumulating loan loss provisions or adding to the capital base. In March 2020, these considerations on the use of the planned but non-distributed dividends had important implications for financial stability in view of the considerable uncertainty about the future path of the Covid-19 crisis. For this exercise, we use the following econometric specifications:

$$\begin{aligned}
LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \alpha Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \beta Acc. Imp_{f,b} + \mu Zombie_{f,b} + \\
& + \theta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times Acc. Imp_{f,b} + \\
& + \omega Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times Zombie_{f,b} + \\
& + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + [\rho_b] + \epsilon_{f,b,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
LendingGr_{f,b,t} = & \alpha Dividends/RWA_{b,t} + \beta NPL_b + \theta Dividends/RWA_{b,t} \times NPL_b + \\
& + \Phi \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \Psi \Sigma Z_{f,b,t-1} + \eta_{f,t} + \rho_b + \epsilon_{f,b,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where in Equation 6 *Acc.Imp.* is a dummy taking the value 1 if identified and recognised loan impairments by bank_b for firm_f prior to the Covid-19 pandemic are within the p25-p95 range of identified and recognised loan impairments in our sample. We augment this specification with a "zombie" dummy that takes the value 1 if prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, identified and recognised loan impairments are above the 95th percentile of impaired loans in our sample. These dummies are compared against impaired loans below the first quartile

(p25) per bank-firm relationship which forms our reference group.²⁰ Equation 7 examines the effects of the recommendation on banks with structurally high NPLs. Banks with high NPL ratio may choose to invest the additional capital obtained from the dividend recommendation in interest bearing loans to offset the losses from the high level of NPLs. To test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable for banks below the median NPL ratio in our sample and use the high NPL banks as a reference group.

As in Equation 1, we use the same set of bank- and policy-specific control variables, along with the same combination of fixed effects to saturate the model. Our primary interest is in the interaction terms, which may reveal increased bank risk-taking behaviour during the pandemic due to banks following the recommendation. Table 4 report the results. Columns (1) - (2) display the self-standing findings for impaired firms. Columns (3)-(4) for "zombie" firms. Columns (5)-(6) include both dummies as in Equation 6. Columns (7)-(8) show the results for the NPL ratio as in Equation 7.

The results indicate that the increase in lending supply due to the dividend recommendation is not directed significantly more towards weak firms. The interaction of our dividend variable with firms with accumulated impairments (those within the p25-p95 range of impaired loans per bank-firm relationship) is not statistically significant. At the same time, the point estimates of the interaction term with more problematic "zombie" borrowers (those above the 95th percentile of impaired loans with a specific bank) have a strongly significant negative coefficient. Interestingly, the effect of the dividend recommendation on "zombie" lending (obtained summing the average effect with the interaction term) is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that for those bank-firm relationships, banks might have accumulated loan loss provisions or added to the capital base.

In columns (7)-(8) we examine the measure of risk-taking at the bank level, the NPL ratio. The estimates suggest that banks with better asset quality tend to take on more risk and generate more loans for each unit of non-distributed dividends. However, banks with

²⁰This dummy variable may not account for new loans granted to riskier enterprises that did not have pre-existing banking relationships prior to the pandemic. Nevertheless, such loans represent a negligible fraction of the sample.

structurally high NPL ratios - the reference group in this specification - show still a 3.3-3.8 p.p. increase in lending for a 1 p.p. increase of the planned but non-distributed dividends ratio. In other words, banks with a high stock of NPLs are likely to use *some* of their non-distributed dividends to absorb losses on their books²¹

4.4 Interaction with time dummies

We then investigate how persistent the impact of the recommendation is. From a policymaker perspective, it is relevant to appreciate whether the effect of restricting dividend distributions is short- or long-lasting. To this end, we interact our treatment variable of interest (*Dividends/RWA*) with quarterly dummies that describe the dynamics of the effect. Since enterprises' liquidity needs are mostly concentrated around the second quarter of 2020, i.e. during the most acute phase of the pandemic and lockdown measures, we would expect higher effects in this quarter.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the results. The estimated model includes interaction terms of *Dividends/RWA* with three quarters: 2020Q2, 2020Q3 and 2020Q4, while the benchmark dummy is represented by the period prior to Covid-19. The estimates show that the impact of the recommendation is mostly short lived with no significant persistent effects: the beneficial impact vanishes in 2020Q4 and it is mostly concentrated in 2020Q3. This result is in line with the temporary nature of the dividend restriction measure that is not intended to produce permanent effects on banks' dividend payout behaviour. The analysis of the effects in the different quarters of 2020 reveals an interesting pattern. Although the dividend recommendation was initially planned to remain in place only until the 1st of October 2020,²² it was extended on the 1st of July 2020 until at least the 1st of January 2021.²³ This could explain the more limited effect of the dividend recommendation in 2022Q2, when banks restricted the use of non-distributed funds to extend lending. However, when it

²¹In a bank-level setting, [Dautović et al. \(2021\)](#) show that loss absorption and capital conservation drive the reallocation of non-distributed dividends.

²²The March ECB [press release](#) asks banks not to pay dividends until at least October 2020.

²³The July ECB [press release](#) extends recommendation not to pay dividends until January 2021.

became clear in July 2020 that the dividend restriction would be in place for the entire year, banks deployed the additional capital to loans. This explains the larger effect in 2020Q3. Another reason for the limited immediate impact of the measure may be the time it takes for management instructions to implement the increase in credit supply, which could also be behind the disproportionate effect in 2020Q3.

5 Robustness checks

5.1 Industry-location-size analysis

In Section 4, we control for the heterogeneity in credit supply across enterprises by exploiting firm with multiple bank relationships and firm-time fixed effects, [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#). However, one shortcoming of the [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) econometric identification strategy is that it excludes single-bank relationships that are absorbed by firm fixed effects. Since the majority of single-bank relationships are with MSMEs, which form the industrial base in European countries, this may lead to sample selection biases. To address this, we follow the approach of [Acharya et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Degryse et al. \(2019\)](#) and construct firm industry-location-size (ILS) fixed effects. To classify the industrial sectors, we use the NACE Rev.2 code, the same as in Equation 3 where the industry cluster are based on 2-digit NACE codes. The location cluster is based on postal code. For size, as in Equation 2, we use the definition given in *Anacredit* to define enterprises' size. In other words, this estimator compares lending outcomes to firms within an industry-postal code-size group across treated versus non-treated banks.

The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6. Overall, the inclusion of ILS fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects allows us to include over 5 million additional observations in the estimation, involving more than 900,000 firms. As shown, the results remain robust when firm fixed effects are replaced by ILS fixed effects. This should reassure on the validity of our baseline findings, limiting also concerns on sample selection biases arising from the omission of enterprises with single-bank relationships. However, the magnitude of the esti-

mates of our baseline in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 6 (2.7-2.9 p.p. for a one p.p. increase in the *Dividend/RWA* ratio) are roughly thirty percent lower in the ILS specification. This implies a larger impact of the dividend recommendation on lending growth to enterprises with multiple bank-relationships and less support for enterprises with no established network of lenders.

Estimates shown in Columns (3)-(6) are also in line with the multiple-relationship sample with two caveats: i) the positive and still significant marginal impact on micro small firms becomes smaller than in Table 1 and; ii) the effect on non-vulnerable sectors is also reduced and only marginally significant while the effect on the vulnerable sector remain broadly unchanged.

5.2 Sample Composition: banks with strictly positive dividend plans

One concern about our estimates is that the control group of banks, which includes those without positive dividend plans *as well as* those with fully distributed dividend plans, may be too diverse also controlling for different bank characteristics. To address this, we ran a robustness test by excluding banks without a positive dividend distribution plan for 2020 from the control group. This resulted in more homogeneous treated and control groups, as both are now made up of banks with strictly positive dividend distribution plans from FY19 profits.

Our findings are presented in 7, which follows the structure of our baseline Table 2. Compared to the baseline estimates this robustness test has fewer banks (71 instead of 99) and fewer enterprises. We lost approximately 14% of the initial sample, but the differences in the magnitude of the effects between this test and the baseline are negligible, as seen in Columns (1)-(2). The same holds true when we analyse the interaction between non-distributed dividends with firm size and vulnerable sectors in Columns (3)-(6) of Table 7. Similarly, the estimates of the coefficients for the set of regressors included to control for the simultaneous policy effects do not vary substantially and maintain statistical significance.

In Table 8, we performed another test of sample composition by excluding from the treatment group five banks that have distributed *some* of their planned dividends after the ECB policy announcement. These five banks are the only group of partially treated banks that might generate self-selection into intensity of treatment bias,²⁴ while the other treated banks have not distributed any planned dividends prior or after the announcement of the dividend recommendation by the ECB. This latter group of banks act as a pure treatment group, with the proportion of distributed dividends over planned being zero. The results of Table 8 do not change our conclusion and our estimates are very close to the baseline.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we examine the impact of the ECB dividend recommendation on bank lending and the risk-taking channel. To isolate the effects of loan demand and loan supply, we use detailed credit registry data and a direct measure of compliance variation among euro area banks. We find that the recommendation was an effective policy tool in supporting non-financial corporate firms in Europe. However, whether dividend restrictions could be broadly effective in sustaining lending during other types of economic crisis remains an open question, particularly in the context of banking crisis.

The study shows that the policy has significant credit supply effects on lending to small and medium enterprises and Covid-19 vulnerable sectors. However, the policy is not as effective in sustaining the flow of credit towards enterprises that may need it the most, such as those with only one bank relationship or micro enterprises with limited collateral value.

This suggests that interactions with other support policies are critical to strengthen the combined effectiveness of lending support programs. In the case of Covid-19, the effects of dividend recommendation are amplified from the interaction with fiscal policies, such as government loan guarantees.

²⁴Strictly speaking, those banks are effectively compliant with the ECB recommendation, but they had already committed some of the funds and received approval just few days prior to the ECB announcement at their shareholders' meetings, which paved the way for their inevitable disbursement.

In addition, the policy does not benefit all banks, as those in the lower 25th percentile of the distance from the minimum capital requirement do not expand their lending indicating that capital constraints are still binding. By contrast, the effectiveness of the dividend recommendation policy on lending growth are substantial for banks with a better capital position. The study also finds no evidence of a significant increase in lending to riskier borrowers or "zombie" enterprises or increased risk-taking by banks with structurally high NPLs.

The efficacy of dividend recommendation policies needs to be evaluated with other elements of the capital regulation framework. Basel III regulation introduced automatic and increasing dividend distribution constraints when capital levels fall below a buffer threshold. In a crisis context, a trade-off arises between preserving corporate franchise value by not breaching the threshold, or supporting the financial intermediation process and the real economy. More research is needed to fully understand the interaction of dividend restrictions with other prudential policies. Specific policies aimed at restricting dividend distribution can optimally interact with the countercyclical capital buffer release and can help address the disincentives to increase loan supply. In other words, stigma effects stemming from distribution constraints would be removed: banks would no longer have disincentives to use capital buffers, [Svoronos and Vrbaski \(2020\)](#).

Finally, supervisory actions aimed at restricting dividend distributions in a downturn when combined with a macroprudential capital buffer release, would eliminate the externality that bank managers would opt for allocating released capital buffers to dividend distributions. It is worth noting that from a welfare perspective, easing capital requirements to increase lending mechanically reduces banks' loss absorption capacity, which can be of fundamental importance in a downturn. The same unintended effect is not present in a dividend restriction since it nudges banks to use new capital to generate lending without hurting the loss absorption capacity.

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
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
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Figure 1: ECB Survey on dividend distribution plans by significant institutions




Note: The chart plots the aggregate evolution of dividend distribution plans by significant banks in the euro area as of March 2020. From the initial plan to distribute EUR 37.2 billion, banks already distributed EUR 9.6 billion in the first three months of 2020 forming one of our treated groups. The already cancelled dividend distributions amounted at EUR 3.6 billion with a potential for total cancellations of EUR 11.8 billions. The amount of non-distributed dividends is indicated by the red area, i.e. the difference between the 2019 retention and the remaining distribution planned in 2021 from fiscal year 2019 (FY'19) profits. As of March 2020 this was the amount of surplus capital that can be employed to support the real economy. Source: ECB banking supervision survey on dividend distribution plans.

Figure 2: The evolution of monetary and fiscal policy measures




Note: The chart shows the timeline of the main variables capturing the variation stemming from monetary and fiscal policy measures aimed at sustaining credit growth. The dashed vertical line indicates 2020Q1. Debt repayment moratoria (rhs) and loan guarantees are represented as shares of total loans aggregate at bank-firm level. Cash at CB/TA is the ratio of cash and cash held at the central bank to total asset and represents a proxy for ECB asset purchases. TLTRO is the ratio of TLTRO III uptake over total assets at bank level. Source: Anacredit, ECB supervisory and monetary policy reporting. Authors calculations.

Figure 3: Off-balance sheet exposures and capital releases after Covid




Note: The chart shows the drops in off-balance sheet exposures over total assets, CET1 regulatory capital buffer and CET1 Pillar 2 guidance over RWA releases, after the onset of the Covid pandemic. Off-balance sheet exposures such as drawn credit lines when they are moved to the balance sheet increase lending mechanically. Capital releases instead give regulatory space to banks to issue loans without breaching regulatory requirements. The dashed vertical line indicates 2020Q1. Source: ECB supervisory reporting. Authors calculations.

Figure 4: Distribution of Dividends/RWA




Note: The graph plots the distribution of Dividends/RWA in our baseline multiple relationship sample for 99 banks after the cut-off date of March 2020. It shows the proportion of control group observations with a spike at zero and the treated group observations with differential intensity of treatment. Dividend/RWA is the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 divided by risk weighted assets. Note that one bank distributed slightly more than what was its distribution plan prior to Covid-19 and therefore the histogram lies in the negative territory. Sources: ECB banking supervision survey on dividend distribution plans, ECB supervisory banking statistics.

Figure 5: Credit growth and undistributed dividends



Note: The chart illustrates the spike in planned but non-distributed dividends (rhs) and the spike in credit growth. The dashed vertical line indicates 2020Q1 when the ECB recommendation was issued. Source: Anacredit and ECB banking supervision survey on dividend distribution plans.

Figure 6: Lending growth trend over 2019Q2-2020Q1



Note: The figure displays the growth in average bank-firm lending level for thhe two groups of banks. The first group, shown by the orange dashed line, includes control banks (non treated) that either did not follow the ECB’s recommendation on dividends distribution or were not affected by it. The second group, represented by the blue dashed line includes the treated banks that followed the recommendation by suspending partly or fully their dividend distribution plans. Source: Anacredit and authors’ calculations.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std.dev.	Min.	p25	p75	Max.
<i>PANEL A: BANK-FIRM LEVEL</i>							
Lending Growth	6'360'304	0.059	0.439	-1.000	-0.050	0.000	2.483
Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria	6'360'304	0.003	0.045	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Share of Loan with Gov. Guarantees	6'360'304	0.103	0.259	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>PANEL B: BANK-LEVEL</i>							
Dividends/RWA	6'360'304	0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.000	0.002	0.023
Ln(TA)	6'360'304	26.701	1.210	21.836	25.743	27.561	28.256
Mkt debt funding/TA	6'360'304	0.109	0.062	0.000	0.080	0.125	0.806
RWA/TA	6'360'304	0.397	0.083	0.034	0.348	0.432	0.787
NIM (annualised)	6'360'304	0.015	0.006	0.001	0.012	0.016	0.031
NPL ratio	6'360'304	0.058	0.059	0.000	0.030	0.069	0.444
CET1 MDA Distance	6'360'304	0.041	0.024	0.004	0.025	0.055	0.489
Cash at CB/TA	6'360'304	0.082	0.042	0.003	0.049	0.104	0.484
Provisions/TA	6'359'763	0.007	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.009	0.029
TLTRO III/TA	6'360'304	0.067	0.123	0.000	0.000	0.080	0.476
Off-balance sheet/TA	6'360'304	0.269	0.094	0.027	0.194	0.357	0.634

Note: The table presents summary descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical framework. The sample period covers from 2019Q2 to 2021Q1. The table is divided in two panels: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the bank-firm level variables whilst panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables. Lending growth is the growth in the stock of debt for firm-bank relationship. Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria is the share of loans under moratoria, and Share of Loan Guarantees is the share of loans under government guaranteed schemes for each bank-firm relationship. Dividend/RWA is the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 divided by risk weighted assets. Ln(TA) is the logarithm of bank total assets. Mkt debt funding is the ratio of debt securities to total assets. RWA/TA is the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. NIM (annualised) is the net interest margins computed on a rolling annualised base. NPL ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. CET1 MDA Distance is the CET1 ratio in excess of the maximum distributable amount. Cash at CB/TA is the ratio of cash and cash held at the central bank to total assets. Provisions/TA is the ratio of the stock of loan loss provisions to total assets. TLTRO III is the ratio of Central Bank long-term bank funding uptake to total assets. Off-balance sheet is the ratio of off-balance sheet activities to total assets.

Table 2: Baseline results and controls for firm size and vulnerable sectors

Dep.var.: Lending Growth $_{bft}$	Baseline		Firm Size		Vulnerable Sectors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$	4.311	4.444	4.169	4.368	2.234	2.823
Medium ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.009)***	(0.006)***
Small ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.052	1.636		
Micro ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			(0.001)***	(0.001)***		
Vulnerable sectors \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.678	1.811		
			(0.001)***	(0.003)***		
			-1.000	-1.652		
			(0.293)	(0.037)**		
					2.882	2.216
					(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Ln(TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.006	-0.169	0.005	-0.192	0.005	-0.171
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{bt-1}$	(0.039)**	(0.104)	(0.080)*	(0.082)*	(0.045)**	(0.101)
(RWA/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.053	-0.212	-0.056	-0.120	-0.057	-0.211
(NIM annualised) $_{bt-1}$	(0.196)	(0.433)	(0.224)	(0.680)	(0.163)	(0.436)
(NPL ratio) $_{bt-1}$	-0.014	-0.516	-0.019	-0.535	-0.019	-0.522
(CET1 MDA Distance) $_{bt-1}$	(0.774)	(0.043)**	(0.725)	(0.040)**	(0.706)	(0.041)**
	3.711	2.442	3.936	2.479	3.751	2.413
	(0.000)***	(0.142)	(0.000)***	(0.159)	(0.000)***	(0.147)
	0.169	0.291	0.161	0.270	0.171	0.290
	(0.019)**	(0.197)	(0.027)**	(0.235)	(0.018)**	(0.199)
	0.452	1.867	0.480	1.913	0.446	1.854
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
	0.111	-0.013	0.106	-0.008	0.109	-0.012
	(0.069)*	(0.890)	(0.114)	(0.932)	(0.075)*	(0.894)
	-0.078	10.865	-0.203	11.349	-0.080	10.809
	(0.921)	(0.005)***	(0.810)	(0.004)***	(0.919)	(0.006)***
	0.024	0.002	0.022	0.000	0.024	0.002
	(0.083)*	(0.729)	(0.135)	(0.948)	(0.082)*	(0.718)
	0.368	0.370	0.373	0.376	0.368	0.371
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
	0.186	0.206	0.195	0.217	0.186	0.206
	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***
	-0.035	0.077	-0.039	0.105	-0.035	0.076
	(0.133)	(0.474)	(0.120)	(0.281)	(0.137)	(0.478)
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6'359'243	6'359'243	5'805'927	5'805'927	6'359'243	6'359'243
N. Banks	99	99	99	99	99	99
N. Firms	541'138	541'138	483'024	483'024	541'138	541'138
R ²	0.471	0.472	0.470	0.471	0.471	0.473

Note: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1. P-values shown in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The regression sample includes only multiple bank-firm relationships. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Table 3: Interactions with other policies

Dep.var.: Lending Growth $_{bft}$	Guarantees		Distance MDA	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$	1.480 (0.090)*	1.878 (0.098)*	5.101 (0.000)***	6.490 (0.000)***
(Share of Loan Guarantees) $_{bft} > 0$	0.312 (0.000)***	0.315 (0.000)***		
(Share of Loan Guarantees) $_{bft} > 0 \times (Dividends/RWA)_{bt}$	5.436 (0.009)***	5.379 (0.016)**		
Distance MDA $_{bt} = < p25$			0.003 (0.721)	
Distance MDA $_{bt} = < p25 \times (Dividends/RWA)_{bt}$			-5.797 (0.007)***	-7.292 (0.017)**
Ln(TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.005 (0.053)*	-0.214* (0.078)	0.005 (0.062)*	-0.251 (0.111)**
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.060 (0.087)	-0.254 (0.480)	-0.000 (0.982)	0.113 (0.712)
(RWA/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.072 (0.119)	-0.618 (0.024)**	-0.028 (0.551)	-0.841 (0.004)***
NIM (rolling) $_{bt-1}$	3.155 (0.000)***	3.979 (0.044)**	3.239 (0.000)***	0.763 (0.749)
(NPL ratio) $_{bt-1}$	0.215 (0.002)***	0.405 (0.111)	0.180 (0.019)**	0.400 (0.087)*
(CET1 MDA Distance) $_{bt-1}$	0.404 (0.000)***	1.627 (0.000)***		
(Cash at CB/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.176 (0.004)	0.132 (0.154)	0.103 (0.109)	-0.053 (0.615)
(Provisions/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.035 (0.968)	7.319 (0.037)**	-0.014 (0.989)	6.128 (0.131)
(Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria) $_{bft}$	0.019 (0.216)	0.002 (0.774)	0.028 (0.062)*	0.003 (0.676)
(Share of Loan Guarantees) $_{bft}$			0.370 (0.000)***	0.370 (0.000)***
(TLTRO) $_{bt-1}$	0.179 (0.000)***	0.208 (0.002)***	0.162 (0.001)***	0.188 (0.002)***
(Off-balance sheet/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.050 (0.057)*	0.101 (0.393)	-0.047 (0.068)*	0.157 (0.120)
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243
Banks	99	99	99	99
Firms	541,138	541,138	541,138	541,138
R ²	0.483	0.485	0.470	0.472

Note: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA); a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a bank has granted a loan that is partially or fully pledged by a government guaranteed scheme, and 0 otherwise (Share of Loan Guarantees > 0). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Table 4: Risk-taking. Impaired and Zombie Firms, NPLs

Dep.var.: Lending Growth _{bt}	Impaired Firms		Zombie Firms		Impaired, Zombie Firms		High NPL Banks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(Dividends/RWA) _{bt}	2.543	2.663	3.115	2.952	3.057	3.678	3.815	3.272
	(0.001)***	(0.041)**	(0.000)***	(0.011)**	(0.000)***	(0.004)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
p25 < impaired _f (19Q4) < p95	-0.008	-0.008			-0.008	-0.008		
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***			(0.000)***	(0.000)***		
p25 < impaired _f (19Q4) < p95 × (Dividends/RWA) _{bt}	0.671	0.100			0.1522	-0.892		
	(0.194)	(0.858)			(0.767)	(0.060)*		
Zombie _f			0.004	0.006	-0.003	-0.001		
			(0.596)	(0.447)	(0.699)	(0.904)		
Zombie _f × (Dividends/RWA) _{bt}			-2.545	-3.774	-2.509	-4.606		
			(0.057)*	(0.007)***	(0.065)*	(0.002)***		
NPL _{bt} < p50							0.015	
							(0.054)*	
NPL _{bt} < p50 × (Dividends/RWA) _{bt}							2.772	7.769
							(0.288)	(0.001)***
Ln(TA) _{bt-1}	0.005	-0.216	0.005	-0.217	0.005	-0.216	0.004	-0.161
	(0.092)*	(0.092)*	(0.083)*	(0.092)*	(0.092)*	(0.092)*	(0.148)	(0.130)
(Mkt debt funding/TA) _{bt-1}	-0.068	-0.251	-0.071	-0.256	-0.067	-0.258	-0.111	-0.021
	(0.035)**	(0.460)	(0.029)**	(0.451)	(0.038)**	(0.445)	(0.008)***	(0.944)
(RWA/TA) _{bt-1}	-0.022	-0.541	-0.021	-0.542	-0.021	-0.540	0.048	-0.478
	(0.615)	(0.042)**	(0.631)	(0.042)**	(0.636)	(0.043)**	(0.361)	(0.058)*
(NIM annualised) _{bt-1}	3.568	2.255	3.554	2.238	3.563	2.240	3.383	2.960
	(0.000)***	(0.212)	(0.000)***	(0.215)	(0.000)***	(0.215)	(0.000)***	(0.069)*
(NPL ratio) _{bt-1}	0.172	0.408	0.179	0.407	0.171	0.406		
	(0.012)**	(0.105)	(0.009)***	(0.105)	(0.013)***	(0.106)		
CET1 MDA Distance _{bt-1}	0.400	1.671	0.402	1.680	0.402	1.681	0.457	1.916
	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
(Cash/TA) _{bt-1}	0.202	0.033	0.200	0.033	0.202	0.032	0.106	-0.038
	(0.003)***	(0.761)	(0.003)***	(0.110)	(0.003)***	(0.767)	(0.050)**	(0.699)
(Provisions/TA) _{bt-1}	-0.060	10.357	-0.046	10.410	-0.054	10.365	-0.079	10.489
	(0.947)	(0.025)**	(0.959)	(0.025)**	(0.952)	(0.025)**	(0.925)	(0.006)***
(Share Debt Moratoria) _{bft}	0.027	0.004	0.027	0.004	0.028	0.004	0.024	0.003
	(0.119)	(0.730)	(0.129)	(0.737)	(0.113)	(0.721)	(0.083)*	(0.629)
(Share Loan Guarantees) _{bft}	0.830	0.831	0.830	0.831	0.830	0.831	0.371	0.372
	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
(TLTRO/TA) _{bt-1}	0.209	0.240	0.210	0.240	0.209	0.241	0.201	0.203
	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.002)***	(0.000)***	(0.001)***
(Off-balance sheet/TA) _{bt-1}	-0.040	0.067	-0.046	0.067	-0.039	0.068	-0.025	0.099
	(0.099)*	(0.530)	(0.067)*	(0.532)	(0.119)	(0.527)	(0.306)	(0.377)
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4,942,749	4,942,749	4,942,749	4,942,749	4,942,749	4,942,749	6,359,243	6,359,243
N. Banks	96	96	96	96	96	96	99	99
N. Firms	331,088	331,088	331,088	331,088	331,088	331,088	541,138	541,138
R ²	0.500	0.501	0.500	0.501	0.500	0.501	0.471	0.473

Note: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The regression sample contains only multiple bank-firm relationships. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Table 5: Interaction with quarterly dummies

Dependent Variable:	Lending Growth	
	(1)	(2)
Dividends/RWA \times 2020Q2	3.793 (0.079)*	2.452 (0.357)
Dividends/RWA \times 2020Q3	12.977 (0.001)***	11.415 (0.001)***
Dividends/RWA \times 2020Q4	1.995 (0.221)	1.058 (0.527)
Ln(TA) $_{t-1}$	0.0046 (0.100)*	-0.116 (0.197)
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.050 (0.236)	0.106 (0.664)
(RWA/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.021 (0.647)	-0.581 (0.022)**
NIM (rolling) $_{t-1}$	3.707 (0.000)***	3.706 (0.035)**
(NPL ratio) $_{t-1}$	0.197 (0.013)**	0.215 (0.281)
(CET1 MDA Distance) $_{t-1}$	0.419 (0.000)***	1.869 (0.000)
(Cash at CB/TA) $_{t-1}$	0.137 (0.032)**	0.100 (0.404)
(Provisions/TA) $_{t-1}$	0.146 (0.822)	11.283 (0.002)***
(Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria) $_{bft}$	0.023 (0.068)*	0.000 (0.958)
(Share of Loan Guarantees) $_{bft}$	0.368 (0.000)***	0.370 (0.000)***
(TLTRO) $_{t-1}$	0.151 (0.000)***	0.0.139 (0.011)**
(Off-balance sheet/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.0381 (0.111)	0.033 (0.721)
Firm-Quarter	Yes	Yes
Bank	No	Yes
Observations	6,359,243	6,359,243
Banks	99	99
Firms	541,138	541,138
R ²	0.471	0.485

Note: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The endogenous variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA) and its interaction with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for different quarters. The set of control variables is specified in Equation 1.

Table 6: Industry-location-size fixed effects and inclusion of single bank relationship firms

Dependent Variable:	Lending Growth					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dividends/RWA	2.943 (0.006)***	2.711 (0.082)*	3.711 (0.000)***	3.514 (0.001)***	1.179 (0.098)*	1.007 (0.486)
Medium firms \times Dividends/RWA			1.727 (0.003)***	1.436 (0.002)***		
Small firms \times Dividends/RWA			2.299 (0.008)***	1.628 (0.010)***		
Micro firms \times Dividends/RWA			-2.088 (0.060)*	-2.590 (0.023)**		
Vulnerable Sectors \times Dividends/RWA					2.704 (0.000)***	2.036 (0.003)***
Ln(TA) $_{t-1}$	0.0044 (0.158)	-0.150 (0.085)*	0.004 (0.171)	-0.148 (0.089)*	0.004 (0.180)	-0.152 (0.081)*
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.0374 (0.390)	0.197 (0.491)	-0.0350 (0.414)	0.190 (0.287)	-0.038 (0.364)	0.194 (0.500)
(RWA/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.031 (0.390)	-0.312 (0.157)	-0.030 (0.589)	-0.300 (0.175)	-0.038 (0.550)	-0.318 (0.150)
NIM (rolling) $_{t-1}$	3.384 (0.000)***	3.341 (0.148)	3.366 (0.000)***	3.170 (0.159)	3.422 (0.000)***	3.201 (0.153)
(NPL ratio) $_{t-1}$	0.068 (0.218)	0.021 (0.917)	0.069 (0.208)	0.018 (0.928)	0.072 (0.191)	0.018 (0.928)
(CET1 MDA Distance) $_{t-1}$	0.331 (0.010)***	1.464 (0.000)***	0.323 (0.011)**	1.487 (0.000)***	0.321 (0.000)***	1.461 (0.000)***
(Cash at CB/TA) $_{t-1}$	0.041 (0.565)	-0.010 (0.924)	0.036 (0.617)	-0.008 (0.934)	0.036 (0.622)	-0.009 (0.932)
(Provisions/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.492 (0.544)	8.545 (0.013)**	-0.465 (0.559)	8.639 (0.012)**	-0.477 (0.553)	8.499 (0.014)**
(Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria) $_{bft}$	0.011 (0.157)	0.005 (0.317)	0.011 (0.159)	0.005 (0.304)	0.012 (0.146)	0.005 (0.289)
(Share of Loan Guarantees) $_{bft}$	0.271 (0.000)***	0.274 (0.000)***	0.272 (0.000)***	0.274 (0.000)***	0.272 (0.000)***	0.274 (0.000)***
(TLTRO) $_{t-1}$	0.156 (0.000)	0.146 (0.007)***	0.157 (0.000)***	0.147 (0.007)***	0.157 (0.000)***	0.146 (0.007)***
(Off-balance sheet/TA) $_{t-1}$	-0.021 (0.376)	0.060 (0.589)	-0.021 (0.378)	0.060 (0.590)	-0.022 (0.360)	0.062 (0.581)
ILS-Quarter	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	11,362,178	11,362,178	11,362,178	11,362,178	11,362,178	11,362,178
Banks	99	99	99	99	99	99
Firms	1,463,993	1,463,993	1,463,993	1,463,993	1,463,993	1,463,993
R ²	0.347	0.348	0.347	0.348	0.347	0.348

Note: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The endogenous variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Table 7: Banks with strictly positive dividend distribution plans

Dep.var. Lending Growth $_{bft}$	Banks with Strictly Positive Dividend Plans					
	Baseline		Firm Size		Vulnerable Sectors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$	4.388 (0.000)***	4.027 (0.005)***	4.031 (0.000)***	3.770 (0.004)***	2.225 (0.010)***	2.403 (0.087)*
Medium ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.155 (0.002)***	1.629 (0.003)***		
Small ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.998 (0.002)***	1.931 (0.006)***		
Micro ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			-0.721 (0.477)	-1.437 (0.111)		
Vulnerable sectors \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$					3.026 (0.000)***	2.238 (0.000)***
Ln(TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.009 (0.011)**	-0.118 (0.277)	0.008 (0.023)**	-0.139 (0.218)	0.009 (0.013)**	-0.121 (0.267)
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.023 (0.631)	0.165 (0.628)	-0.025 (0.642)	0.259 (0.483)	-0.027 (0.573)	0.170 (0.618)
(RWA/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.029 (0.643)	-0.729 (0.042)**	-0.034 (0.616)	-0.764 (0.039)**	-0.035 (0.580)	-0.736 (0.041)**
(NIM annualised) $_{bt-1}$	3.782 (0.000)***	6.582 (0.001)***	3.992 (0.000)***	6.478 (0.002)***	3.830 (0.000)***	6.539 (0.001)***
(NPL ratio) $_{bt-1}$	0.423 (0.000)***	1.664 (0.003)***	0.428 (0.000)***	1.700 (0.004)***	0.424 (0.000)***	1.656 (0.004)***
CET1 MDA Distance) $_{bt-1}$	0.499 (0.001)***	2.039 (0.000)***	0.533 (0.002)***	2.044 (0.000)***	0.494 (0.001)***	2.024 (0.000)***
(Cash/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.140 (0.116)	-0.117 (0.344)	0.132 (0.178)	-0.108 (0.420)	0.136 (0.129)	-0.116 (0.346)
(Provisions/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.096 (0.935)	12.851 (0.006)***	-0.124 (0.919)	13.182 (0.006)***	0.091 (0.938)	12.808 (0.006)***
(Share Debt Moratoria) $_{bft}$	0.034 (0.056)*	0.007 (0.313)	0.035 (0.072)*	0.008 (0.351)	0.034 (0.057)*	0.007 (0.304)
(Share Loan Guarantees) $_{bft}$	0.359 (0.000)***	0.365 (0.000)***	0.363 (0.000)***	0.370 (0.000)***	0.359 (0.000)***	0.366 (0.000)***
(TLTRO/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.183 (0.000)***	0.245 (0.000)***	0.188 (0.000)***	0.259 (0.000)***	0.183 (0.000)***	0.245 (0.000)***
(Off balance sheet/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.034 (0.275)	0.114 (0.326)	-0.036 (0.270)	0.153 (0.236)	-0.034 (0.281)	0.114 (0.330)
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5'476'337	5'476'337	5'012'858	5'012'858	5'476'337	5'476'337
N. Banks	71	71	70	70	71	71
N. Firms	475'966	475'966	426'261	426'261	475'966	475'966
R ²	0.481	0.483	0.480	0.482	0.481	0.483

Note: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The regression sample contains only multiple bank-firm relationships. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Table 8: Self-selection into intensity of treatment?

Dep.var.: Lending Growth $_{bft}$	Removing control banks that distributed dividends after March 2020					
	Baseline		Firm Size		Vulnerable Sectors	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$	3.366 (0.001)***	4.491 (0.000)***	3.263 (0.003)***	4.518 (0.000)***	1.471 (0.079)*	2.754 (0.006)***
Medium ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.228 (0.000)***	1.742 (0.000)***		
Small ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			2.632 (0.001)***	1.883 (0.002)***		
Micro ent. \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$			-1.317 (0.095)*	-1.909 (0.004)***		
Vulnerable sectors \times (Dividends/RWA) $_{bt}$					2.645 (0.000)***	2.378 (0.000)***
Ln(TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.007 (0.014)**	-0.170 (0.100)*	0.006 (0.034)**	-0.194 (0.076)*	0.007 (0.017)**	-0.172 (0.097)*
(Mkt debt funding/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.077 (0.059)*	-0.249 (0.429)	-0.086 (0.059)*	-0.157 (0.655)	-0.080 (0.049)**	-0.246 (0.434)
(RWA/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.018 (0.693)	-0.409 (0.077)*	0.018 (0.711)	-0.434 (0.064)*	0.013 (0.777)	-0.415 (0.072)*
(NIM annualised) $_{bt-1}$	2.945 (0.007)***	-0.214 (0.919)	3.266 (0.005)***	-0.454 (0.854)	2.984 (0.006)***	-0.263 (0.901)
(NPL ratio) $_{bt-1}$	0.181 (0.006)***	0.167 (0.357)	0.168 (0.010)***	0.149 (0.420)	0.183 (0.005)***	0.164 (0.363)
(CET1 MDA Distance) $_{bt-1}$	0.605 (0.000)***	1.228 (0.000)***	0.656 (0.000)***	1.224 (0.000)***	0.601 (0.000)***	1.210 (0.000)***
(Cash/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.137 (0.036)**	0.005 (0.946)	0.140 (0.058)*	0.006 (0.944)	0.135 (0.039)**	-0.005 (0.945)
(Provisions/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.273 (0.722)	0.628 (0.796)	-0.475 (0.566)	0.606 (0.820)	-0.280 (0.713)	0.520 (0.830)
(Share Debt Moratoria) $_{bft}$	0.016 (0.269)	-0.000 (0.952)	0.012 (0.406)	-0.004 (0.616)	0.016 (0.265)	-0.003 (0.961)
(Share Loan Guarantees) $_{bft}$	0.408 (0.000)***	0.410 (0.000)***	0.413 (0.000)***	0.415 (0.000)***	0.408 (0.000)***	0.410 (0.000)***
(TLTRO/TA) $_{bt-1}$	0.216 (0.000)***	0.220 (0.002)***	0.228 (0.000)***	0.233 (0.002)***	0.216 (0.000)***	0.220 (0.002)***
(Off-balance sheet/TA) $_{bt-1}$	-0.014 (0.544)	0.092 (0.360)	-0.014 (0.578)	0.123 (0.329)	-0.014 (0.545)	0.092 (0.401)
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,138,561	5,138,561	4,641,752	4,641,752	5,138,561	5,138,561
N. Banks	94	94	94	94	94	94
N. Firms	441,496	441,496	389,396	389,396	441,496	441,496
R ²	0.462	0.464	0.462	0.463	0.463	0.464

Note: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1. P-values in parenthesis are derived from two-way clustered standard errors at both bank and firm levels. The regression sample contains only multiple bank-firm relationships. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variables include the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

Appendix

Supervisory Policy Stimulus: Evidence from the Euro Area Dividend Recommendation

Table A1: Variables, labels, definitions and sources

Variable	Label	Definition	Source
Endogenous variable:			
Lending	Lending growth	Growth of loans from bank i to firm f	AnaCredit
Variable of interest:			
Non Distrib. Dividends	Dividends/RWA	The ratio of the cancelled dividends planned for 2020 over RWAs	SSM survey
Bank control variables:			
Funding structure	Mkt debt funding/TA	The ratio of debt securities-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Bank size	$\ln(TA)$	Logarithm of bank total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Risk weight density	RWA/TA	The ratio of risk-weighted assets-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Net interest margin	NIM (annualised)	Ratio of interest earning assets minus interest bearing liabilities-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Non-performing loans	NPL ratio	The ratio of non-performing loans-to-gross loans	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Capitalisation	CET1 MDA Distance	The CET1 ratio in excess of the maximum distributable amount	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Liquidity	Cash at CB/TA	The ratio of cash and cash held at the central bank-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Off-balance sheet	OFF BS	The ratio of off balance sheet activities-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Provisions	Provisions/TA	The ratio of provisions-to-total assets	ECB Supervisory Statistics
Policy control variables:			
Monetary policy	TLTRO	The ratio of targeted longer term refinancing operations-to-total assets	ECB Market Operations Database
Moratoria	Share of Debt Repayment Moratoria	Bank-firm level share of loans subjected to debt moratoria	AnaCredit
Guarantees	Share of Loan Guarantees	Bank-firm level share of loans subject to government guarantees	AnaCredit

Table A2: Results with alternative Standard Errors clustering

Dep.var.: Lending Growth _{bt}	Clustering of Std.errors					
	Bank-Time		Bank		Bank-Time-Firm	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Dividends/RWA) _{bt}	4.311 (0.029)**	4.444 (0.036)**	4.311 (0.001)***	4.444 (0.001)***	4.311 (0.004)***	4.444 (0.033)**
Bank controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policy controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243	6,359,243
N. Banks	99	99	99	99	99	99
N. Firms	541,138	541,138	541,138	541,138	541,138	541,138
R ²	0.471	0.472	0.470	0.471	0.471	0.473

Note: ***, 0.01, **, 0.05, *, 0.1. P-values shown in parenthesis. The regression sample contains only multiple bank-firm relationships. The dependent variable is the growth in the stock of debt (Lending growth). The exogenous variable is the ratio of dividend planned in 2019 but not distributed in 2020 to risk weighted assets (Dividends/RWA). Control variables are specified in Equation 1.

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